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Abstract 
The aim of this MA thesis is to demonstrate how corporate concentration within 
the global music industry specifically affects the Canadian music industry's ability 
to compete for its own national audience as well as audiences worldwide. 
Federal public policies, regulatory regimes and subsidies are considered within 
the context of the structure of the global marketplace which is, in effect, an 
oligopoly controlled by four major corporations. Through an extensive literature 
review of political economy theory, Canadian public policies and music studies, 
as well as personal interviews conducted with Canadian musicians, 
entrepreneurs and public servants, I will situate my research within the body of 
political economy theory; present a detailed report of the structure of the global 
music industry; address the key players within the industry; describe the 
relationship between the major corporations and the independent companies 
operating in the industry; discuss how new technologies affect said relationships; 
consider the effectiveness of Canadian public policies in safeguarding the 
national music industry; and recommend steps that can be taken to remedy the 
shortcomings of Federal policies and regulatory regimes. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Setting the Scene 
In February 2005, the U.S. based music magazine Spin ran a feature article 
entitled "Montreal- The Next Big Scene" (Perez). The article documented 
1 
some of the bands, labels and venues that have helped to "put Montreal back 
on the musical map" (Perez, 62). This article launched a wave of media 
attention from U.S. publications such as the New York Times and Rolling 
Stone, heralding Montreal as the next 'hot' scene, perpetuated through 
extensive coverage of bands like the Dears, the Stars, Wolf Parade and 
particularly Arcade Fire, which has been publicly praised by the likes of David 
Bowie and David Byrne. These articles frequently present Montreal as "the 
new Seattle." 
While Montreal is not the first city, or even the first Canadian city1, to 
arouse comparisons to Seattle in the media, the attention inspired mixed 
emotions from local fans and musicians that ranged from indifference to 
suspicion to outrage (O'Meara 2005). In fact, it is the Seattle analogies that 
seem to have made many Montrealers particularly uneasy. 
The 'Seattle scene' that came to be associated with the 'grunge' genre2 
emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Bell 1998), mainly as a result of 
I Halifax was declared 'the new Seattle' in the early '90's, and the band Sloan had even 
been dubbed the new Nirvana by some eager Canadian journalists (Barclay 2001). 
2 'Grunge' has been described as a combination of punk and heavy metal influences 
(www.silver-dragon-records.com/grunge.htm) 
the international success of the bands Nirvana and Pearl Jam. Thomas Bell 
(1998,86) summarized the Seattle scene as follows: 
Seattle grew to predominance because of the juxtaposition of 
creative talent, record company agents anxious to sign new talent, 
and several successful independent record labels such as Sub Pop 
Records. As the music of Seattle became more mainstream, much 
of the creative energy was lost. Grunge metamorphosed into a 
Madison Avenue advertising ploy. Movies such as "Singles" hyped 
the Seattle scene until it became a parody of itself. The media have 
seemed to tire of Seattle and have moved on to search for the next 
music scene. 
Local music fans seemed to be concerned that Montreal could be mined for 
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talent, exploited for the almighty dollar and left drained, like Seattle was after 
the 1990s grunge wave. One apprehensive fan posted the following comment 
on the Montreal Hourwebsite3: 
Unlike Seattle, Montreal is an island where we can only hope to 
remain inaccessible and cut off from the mainland of Britney 
Spearsization. Any band that has tried to "make it" knows how the 
business can dull musical instinct. So why should we care who gets 
the spotlight in some American mainstream culture magazine? I 
don't think SPIN or any magazine that lands in town carrying the 
warped corporate ideology of the modern day music industry, will 
ever come to appreciate the likes of a 1990's era Seattle, or present 
day Montreal. Montreal thrives in the music scene by doing what it 
does best - being different. 
(Montreal Hour Online) 
Buried within this rant lies the manifestation of a contradiction inherent in 
rock music: the musician's struggle between the 'local' and the 'global' is a tug 
of war between maintaining a sense of an artistic community and striving to 
reach the largest possible audience - the latter often being associated with 
'selling out'. Furthermore, the artistic integrity and politics of resistance 
3 The Montreal Hour is a local English entertainment weekly. 
embodied by the meta-genre of rock conflict with the production and market 
system on which it is dependent (Shevory 1995, 24). 
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Despite rock music's status as one of the most popular forms of cultural 
expression existing today, it is no longer possible to consider popular music 
and the economics of the music industry as if they were two separate realms 
(Fenster & Swiss 1999,228). Sound recording is a globalized industry and, 
according to the International Music Industry Association (lFPI) worldwide CD 
sales in 2006 were $US 19.6 billion (which has declined 5% from 2005), 
Moreover, more than 80 per cent of the world market is controlled by what are 
now down to four 'majors' (after the merger between Sony and BMG in the 
summer of 2004)4 - EMI, Sony-BMG, Warner Music Group, and Vivendi 
Universal. 
The trend towards corporate concentration over the past 10 years or so is 
a result of the "relaxation of regulatory barriers that previously prevented 
consolidation across majors sectors ... [leading to] the major companies' 
scramble to position themselves to maximum advantage in a rapidly moving 
communications environment" (Golding & Murdock 1991, 80). As 'free' market 
economies are becoming increaSingly prevalent on a global scale, major 
communication conglomerates have been extending their reach into territories 
that were previously restricted markets. Historically, the main forms of 
resistance to the processes of corporate concentration and accelerating 
privatization have come from state intervention in the forms of media import 
4 This merger is still being reviewed by the EU. 
restrictions and fostering local industries through public subsidies (Shuker 
2001,71). 
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So, what does this mean for independent musicians in Montreal and 
across Canada? This thesis is concerned with the political economy of the 
music industry as it relates to Canadian independent music and national public 
policy. Using a critical political economy approach as a theoretical framework, 
I began my research with the assumption Canadian public policies aimed at 
protecting the independent music industry are insufficiently developed and do 
not permit Canadian independent musicians and entrepreneurs to successfully 
compete within the market as it is currently structured. Consequently, I 
planned to argue that the distribution of public funds to independent artists 
would only work if they were linked to policy revisions that would limit the 
extent to which the majors maintain oligopolistic control over the industry. 
Critical political economy would further suggest that, without increased 
government intervention in the industry (for example, in the form of limitations 
on media ownership concentration or reinforced anti-monopoly laws), 
regulatory regimes and federal subsidies are inadequate; they are simply 
band-aid solutions for a gaping wound. 
This argument is often cited by political economists (Shuker 2001,71), 
and conclusions reached through this approach have come to be considered 
'predictable' (Negus 1999, 15; Storey 2003, 96), deterministic and elitist 
(Negus 1999; Hall 1980). In order to situate my theoretical framework within 
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the highly contested field of political economic thought, it is necessary to begin 
by addressing the issues raised in debates concerning this approach. 
Critical political economy is rooted in a neo-marxist approach to social 
order. Applied to cultural studies, the critical political economy approach has 
been defined by Peter Golding and Graham Murdock (1991, 70) as "the 
interplay between the symbolic and economic dimensions of public 
communications. It sets out to show how different ways of financing and 
organizing cultural production have traceable consequences for the range of 
discourses and representations in the public domain and for audiences' 
access to them." 
Where classical Marxist thought is often criticized as propounding an 
economic determinist point of view, neo-marxism rejects economic or class 
determinism and asserts a concurrent belief in at least the semi-autonomy of 
the cultural sphere. As Golding and Murdock (1991) have emphasized, the 
critical political economic approach does appreciate the reciprocal relationship 
between a society's economic base and its superstructure (social, political and 
intellectual consciousness). While classical political economy analysis has 
tended to stress the determining effect of the base upon the superstructure 
and devalue the significance and autonomy of culture (Shuker 1998,221), 
critical political economists retain a more flexible notion of economic 
determinism; this implies that we can emphasize "economic dynamics as 
playing a central role in defining the key features of the general environment 
within which communicative activity takes place, but not as a complete 
explanation ofthe nature of that activity" (Golding & Murdock 1991, 74). 
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The recent 'reworking' of the political economy tradition is representative 
of a shift in the theoretical objectives of cultural studies and popular music 
analysis (Shuker 1998, 221) which has tended to emphasize one of two 
polemical approaches: the classical political economic perspective, with its 
tendency for capitalist conspiracy theory, and the postmodern accounts of the 
sovereign consumer, applauding the "heroic resistance fighters in the war of 
cultural deception" (Golding & Murdock 1991,86). Critiques of political 
economy analysis often denounce it for attributing omnipotent power to 
corporate capitalist industry and reducing consumers to passive 'dupes' at the 
mercy of media messages. Such a criticism is addressed by Golding and 
Murdock's approach to political economy. Academics such as John Storey 
may criticize Golding and Murdock's 'reworking' of the political economy 
approach as "good on the economic dimensions but weak on the symbolic" 
(1996,95), but this type of criticism misses the point. While the critical political 
economy perspective seeks to understand how audience responses are 
necessarily situated within wider structures, specifically their position within the 
economic system, it is not a central task of this approach to delineate the 
infinite variety of potential responses and interpretations to different media in 
order to determine how meaning is produced. 
The post-modern, audience-centered approach may be an interesting 
analytical tool in itself insofar as it celebrates the creative power of the 
consumer to subvert the dominant ideological messages underlying media 
content. However, the exhaustive number of studies examining specific 
subcultures and examples of fandom serve only to reiterate the already-
established realizations of this particular 'way into' cultural theory. 
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Furthermore, the audience-focused approach can easily collapse into 
conservative celebrations of the 'free' market philosophy and unbridled 
consumer choice (Golding & Murdock 1991,71). It remains an important task 
of those in the field of cultural studies to examine the ways in which meaning 
is created and recreated as it relates to the media and ideology. However, it is 
just as important to understand how the reciprocal relationship between action 
and structure is constituted as well as the ways in which the cultural industries 
actually operate as industries (Golding & Murdock 1991,72). To quote Golding 
and Murdock once more: "Consumer sovereignty is in any total sense clearly 
impossible- nobody has access to a complete range of cultural goods as and 
when they might wish, without restriction. The task of political economy, then, 
is to examine the barriers that limit such freedom" (86). 
While some academics criticize the political economy approach for not 
emphasizing the active roles of consumers, others have dismissed political 
economic studies that have attempted to demonstrate how corporate 
concentration within the music industry has a deleterious effect on the types of 
music being composed and produced. The most notable of these studies is 
Steve Chapple and Reebee Garofalo's Rock 'n' Roll is Here to Pay (1977), 
which Keith Negus (1999) has condemned as adopting structuralist and 
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instrumentalist points of view. These two approaches are precarious for 
political economists, as the former seeks to explain how social relationships 
and activities attain a fixed quality, thereby not acknowledging the dynamic 
and fluid nature of social structures (Negus, 16), while the latter approach 
assumes that capitalist corporations can use their economic power to ensure 
that media messages are ideologically suited to conform to their best interests 
(Golding & Murdock 1991, 73), and therefore does not acknowledge mediated 
consumer responses and the instability of manipulation tactics. 
In response to critiques of Rock 'n' Roll is Here to Pay as heavily 
instrumentalist, Garofalo (1986) later acknowledged that "there is no point-to-
point correlation between controlling the marketplace economically and 
controlling the form, content and meaning of music" (cited in Negus 1999,16). 
Negus has argued that increasing corporate concentration in the record 
industry does not negatively correlate with levels of creativity and the types of 
sounds being produced by musicians. He has stated: "I've always found 
political economy to be attractive when thinking about my own angst-ridden 
moments while a member of bands signed to record labels, but less 
convincing when thinking about the composition and performance of songs 
and the many activities that are involved in musical consumption" (16). 
Although I tend to follow Negus' emphasis on how the economic organization 
of the record industry does not necessarily affect the creative musical output of 
musicians, it is important to understand how corporate concentration does 
influence consumers' access to a diversity of sounds. 
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In a study entitled "Cycles in Symbol Production: The Case of Popular 
Music" (1975), Richard Peterson and David Berger found that oligopolistic 
concentration in the record industry reduces innovation and leads to a 
homogeneity of product (159). Their study examines data from the 26-year 
period between 1948 and 1973 and details how cycles of market concentration 
and periods of 'competition' directly affect the range of alternative products on 
the market. In order to avoid the traps of instrumentalism and structuralism, it 
is important to acknowledge at this point that, although Peterson and Berger 
present strong evidence to support their conclusions, many factors (including 
new technologies and marketing strategies) have evolved since their study. A 
number of more recent studies of cycles of ownership concentration and the 
diversity of popular music available to consumers (reviewed in Ross 2005) 
have challenged the original findings. However, although more than thirty 
years have passed since Peterson and Berger's original study was published, 
Peter Ross has stated that "while the recorded music market has changed 
dramatically over the past 60 years, the significance of the cycles of symbols 
production approach for music research still prevails" (Ross 2005, 10). 
One of the factors that has changed significantly since the Peterson and 
Berger study involves increased audience fragmentation (Straw 1997, 62). 
According to Will Straw (1997), "as tastes fragment and few records attain the 
sales levels of a Thriller or a Purple Rain, consumer choices no longer 
manifest themselves as broad, collective swings towards this album or that. 
Instead, they are spread among thousands of choices from repertoires 
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accumulated over fifty or sixty years" (59). As a result of audience 
fragmentation, it is likely that one may own several albums listed on Billboard's 
Top 10 without even having heard most of the other artists listed (Straw 1997, 
62). As markets shift, corporate strategies evolve; but one thing that does 
remain the same throughout market cycles and despite academic approaches 
to analyzing the cultural industries is the corporate capitalist priority of making 
profits. After all, the most successful operations are often those that were the 
most competitive, ruthless and devious (Frith 1993,21). Consequently, the 
multinationals (or majors) have all undertaken measures to ensure that they 
can take advantage of every changing nuance of consumer taste (Peterson & 
Berger 1975, 169), whether through contracting artists performing in 
specialized genres to subsidiary companies, or buying out the contracts of 
artists signed to independent labels, or simply taking over the independents. 
So, while some academics have argued that the record industry does not 
"manipulate the public so much as feel its pulse" (Negus 1999, 18), we must 
bear in mind 'feeling the public's pulse' is in itself a corporate strategy easily 
achieved through any number of monitoring methods (websites such as 
Myspace.com help to facilitate this) and through careful analysis of sales 
figures; information gained through these practices is reciprocally used in 
marketing and promotions. Nevertheless, while the powerful owners of 
multinational corporations may not deliberately set out to control the practices 
of musicians, the structure of the industry as it stands today sets up 
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independent artists and labels for a perpetual struggle to compete in what is 
actually an oligopolistic market (Shuker 2001, 31). 
Paradoxically, the emergence of a 'free market' philosophy and a 
tendency towards postmodern pluralism which have become popular in 
cultural studies in recent years, in an attempt to challenge the alleged 
economic determinism of those approaches that rely on neo-marxist views of 
sociological studies, such as critical political economy, has occurred during a 
time of unprecedented corporate concentration, (Golding & Murdock 1991, 86). 
In essence, the starting point for either approach is based on "basic moral 
questions of justice, equity and the public good" (Golding & Murdock 1991, 73). 
Much of the literature emphasizing the critical political economic views of the 
media has been criticized as having elitist tendencies. For proponents of the 
free market philosophy, the public good is maintained through policies of 
privatization that supposedly ensure 'freedom of consumer choice' (Golding & 
Murdock 1991, 73). Those working within the tradition of critical political 
economy have been labeled 'moral leftists' and attacked for supporting the 
"elitist and reactionary argument which claims that more (quantity) always 
means less (quality)" (Storey 1996, 97). 
Such arguments obviously touch on debates within cultural studies that 
distinguish 'high' culture from 'low' (or 'popular') culture. The high culture vs. 
low culture debate is predicated upon the assumption that there is a clear 
distinction between high and low culture, and sees the latter as a residual 
category encompassing what has not met the standards of the former (Storey 
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1993, 7). A major problem inherent in this kind of distinction is that it is heavily 
dependent on taste as a marker of class, in both a socio-economic sense and 
as a measure of moral and aesthetic worth. As Pierre Bourdieu has stated, 
"nothing more clearly affirms one's 'class', nothing more infallibly classifies, 
than tastes in music" (1984, 18). 
The goal of political economy is not to distinguish between high and low 
quality cultural goods. Rather, it is concerned with the privileged position of 
transnational communications conglomerates and their pursuit of audience 
maximization through efforts to create a single mass audience across 
culturally diverse nations (McAnany & Wilkinson 1996, 18). Although many 
political economy studies do examine the ideological implications of what has 
been termed 'cultural imperialism' (Laing 1986; Shuker 1998), I should also 
emphasize that I am less concerned in this thesis with how the content of the 
actual music is interpreted ideologically by audiences. Instead,the primary 
focus of this thesis is how corporate concentration within the music industry 
affects the ability of Canadian artists to compete for a share of their own 
national audience as well as audiences worldwide. 
It is not necessary to invoke theories of cultural imperialism to explain why 
Canadian musicians, writers, actors and other creative artists might require 
some assistance to practice their respective arts. Numerous studies have 
shown that the majority of Canadians spend much more of their money and 
time on American media and cultural products than on Canadian ones. 
According to Sheila Copps, former Minister of Canadian Heritage, as of May 
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2000, "30 percent of all the books that are sold in our country are American ... 
80 percent of the magazines on our news-stands are American. Foreign, 
primarily American content, accounts for 70 percent of the music on our 
English-language radio. 84 percent of CD sales in our country are foreign, 
primarily American. 85 percent of the prime time dramas on English-language 
television come from [the United States]. And 97 percent of the feature films in 
our movie theatres come from Hollywood" (Empire Club Addresses 1999). 
With respect to the sound recording industry, the profit margins of Canadian 
firms (7%) in 1995-96 were still inferior to those realized by the multinational 
record labels in Canada twelve years prior (8.2%). In terms of dollars, the 
majors generated $155 million in profits while the whole of the Canadian-
owned sector generated $14 million. Put another way, the profits that the 
majors garnered in Canada far exceeded the total revenues from the sales of 
recordings of Canadian-controlled firms (approximately $122 million) in 1995-
96 (LeBlanc 2003). 
As mentioned above, the main forms of interruption to the processes of 
corporate concentration have come from national public policies of subsidizing 
local artists, regulatory regimes that can institute quotas, the regulation of 
monopolies and corporate concentration by the European Union/Commission, 
and restricting media imports (Golding & Murdock 1991, 81; Shuker 2001, 71). 
Canada has developed a range of policies to support its domestic music 
industry, starting in 1971, when the Canadian Radio Television and 
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) introduced Canadian content, or 
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'CanCon,' regulations, requiring most radio stations to playa minimum of 30 
percent Canadian music daily. Although the new policy mandate was deemed 
elitist by some critics, it has undoubtedly fostered the success of many 
Canadian musicians since it was introduced (Barclay 2001, 23). For those 
proponents of the free market philosophy who have criticized the CRTC for 
implementing policies to protect Canadian cultural industries and Canadian 
culture in general, a reoccurring sentiment expressed in the media and by the 
public is that "if Canadian culture disappears, for lack of institutional support, 
that doesn't matter much, because nobody watches it or reads it anyway" 
(Gordon 1999). 
In an article entitled "The New Challenge Threatening Culture," published 
in the Canadian news magazine, Maclean's, Charles Gordon addressed the 
hostility towards cultural policy-makers as 'elitism.' He quoted extensively the 
views of free market economist and policy analyst, William Stanbury: 
The elite is not content to indulge its own tastes; it wants to 
'improve' the tastes of others. The elite know to a certainty that if 
they could fully determine the type of cultural products to which the 
masses are exposed and to increase their exposure to these 
products, the masses WOUld, in time, come to demand the cultural 
products promoted by the elite. For the Canadian cultural elite, u.s. 
junk food is positively the worst kind, because it is the product of the 
nation they love to hate. Worst of all, it is popular around the world 
and so further isolates and frustrates the elite. (cited in Gordon 
1999) 
However, this thesis is not an elitist lament on how the public would stand 
to learn a thing or two about high caliber cultural commodities as a result of 
media import restrictions, nor is it a cultural protectionist call to arms in order 
to defend the elusive Canadian culture from our southern neighbors; rather, 
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this thesis is concerned with allowing Canadian musicians to have a fair share 
of market access by opening production, distribution and marketing channels 
beyond oligopolistic control. Gordon (1999) expressed it quite lucidly in the last 
line of his article: "the notion of a cultural elite masks the fact that most of the 
cultural community consists of struggling musicians, artists, actors and writers 
who, far from trying to impose their tastes on anybody, just want to make a 
living in their own country" (13). 
Although the argument being made here is neither entirely original nor 
unexplored within academic and governmental discourse, the central concern 
of this thesis is not simply to present a theoretical critique of the structure of 
the music industry, or to discuss the active roles of consumers in producing 
meaning from cultural texts. By examining the practical, lived experiences of 
those Canadian musicians and music industry entrepreneurs who actively 
participate within this sector of our economy, this thesis will fill a gap within the 
extensive body of research on the music industry in Canada. 
In chapter 2 of this thesis, I will discuss the current structure of the 
'globalized' music industry, the differences between the major labels and indie 
labels, the trend towards vertical integration within the record industry and I 
will also provide a detailed account of the process of production, distribution, 
promotion and sales of recordings in order to demonstrate what is now a 
global trend in the music industry. The influence of new technologies such the 
Internet will also be considered, with a particular emphasis on whether they 
help or hinder the efforts of independent musicians. 
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From a discussion of the global trends in chapter 2, I will proceed to an 
examination of the Canadian market in chapter 3. The strengths and 
weaknesses of the Canadian music industry will be considered in greater 
detail, as will the role of Canadian content regulations in order to gain a better 
understanding of how regulatory regimes affect the Canadian industry. Finally, 
this chapter will present a breakdown of the mandates and policies of the 
Canadian federal government with regards to popular music and will examine 
the controversies surrounding the distribution of the taxpayers' money to the 
highly commercialized music industry. 
Lastly, in chapter 4, I will summarize my findings and, using the 
information gathered throughout this study, I will critically evaluate policy 
recommendations and/or alternatives to the current policies of the Canadian 
government with respect to the Canadian music industry. 
My research includes a literature review encompassing academic studies 
of popular music, theoretical perspectives on political economy and cultural 
industries, and critical perspectives on public policy. I made use of a wide 
range of government documents and industry reports, as well as many web 
sites belonging to government organizations, music corporations, individual 
musicians and music writers. 
This thesis also draws on the expertise and assistance of a number of 
industry insiders: Ian Lavsky, the co-owner of Constellation Records in 
Montreal; Patricia Elliott, who works for Trade Routes (a federal assistance 
program); Meyer Billurcu, co-owner of Blue Skies Turn Black promotions in 
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Montreal and a rep for Sonic Unyon; and Pierre Capentier, general manager of 
FACTOR. All shared with me their perspectives and insights on the Canadian 




The Global Music Industry 
As I have discussed in the preceding chapter, the music industry is a 
multi-billion dollar global business entity. In order to fully understand how it is 
primarily controlled by the 'majors' and is, in effect, an oligopoly, it is 
necessary to examine its structure, which is diverse and highly complex in 
activities and organization. 
Although it may seem a banal observation, the music industry is 
fundamentally structured around the technology that has allowed music to 
become commodified as a stored format, capable of being bought and sold to 
consumers. The history of the popular music industry over the last century has 
been, in many senses, the story of the evolution of successive forms of 
musical storage. Theoretically, we can refer to the memories of musicians as 
the first form of musical storage and, hence, as the first basis for 'money-
making' from musical endeavours; talented musicians would earn more from 
their communities. The development of craft specialization in performing music 
and making musical instruments led to the first music-related divisions of 
labour (Frith 2001, 28-29). 
In the ninth century, Charlemagne invented music notation in order to 
standardize Christian church music, significantly altering the way that music 
was made, stored, distributed and heard (Taylor 2001,3). Subsequently, with 
the invention of movable type in the early sixteenth century, the distribution of 
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music notation became much more efficient and music began to extend 
beyond its former boundaries to a greater number of people, thereby creating 
a "musical public," allowing composers to copyright their work and to become 
recognized as 'artists' (Taylor 2001,4). The composer and the music publisher 
(often the same person in the earliest stages of these developments) emerged 
as the new money-making figures in the music 'market.' The music industry, 
then, before it was ever concerned with producing records, was primarily 
concerned with the protection and regulation of copyrights and was thus 
dependent upon legal structures (Frith 2001, 30). These developments 
contributed to the shaping of a new cultural industry, and consequently, to the 
creation of music consumers; people could purchase music notation to play at 
home on purchased instruments. They could invest in music lessons and they 
could purchase tickets to experience live performances (Frith 2001, 30). 
As significant as these developments were to the young music industry, 
the phonograph, invented in 1877 by Thomas Edison, had a much greater 
impact on both music and society. Originally created for recording purposes, 
"to stabilize representation rather than to multiply it" (Attali 2002, 91), it soon 
became apparent that consumers were less interested in recording their own 
voices than with using the phonograph to enjoy mass-produced entertainment 
(Morton 2000, 5). In 1886, Charles Sumner Tainter perfected the gramophone, 
which made serial repetitions possible since the cylinders on the phonograph 
would wear out after six playings (Attali 2002, 95), and eventually the sound 
recording and playing technology got woven into the fabric of society (Morton 
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2000, 3). Where people had previously 'purchased' music in order to 
reproduce it themselves at home, they began purchasing music 'ready-made', 
provided for the first time as software in the form of a roll or a disc (Frith 2001, 
30), thereby transforming people from producers into consumers (Taylor 2001, 
5). 
This brought music from the realm of the immaterial to the tangible, fixing 
sound to a physical, marketable medium, thereby revolutionizing economic 
constructions of representation and transforming social and cultural space 
(Attali 2002, 95), as well as irrevocably altering public conceptions of the 
musical experience. As Attali noted, U[w]hen Western technology, at the end of 
the nineteenth century, made possible the recording of sound ... [a] new society 
emerged, that of mass production, repetition, the nonproject. Usage was no 
longer the enjoyment of present labors, but the consumption of replications" 
(2002, 87-8). This is not to say that new music technologies simply replaced 
old forms of creating and listening to music - obviously people continue to 
make music outside of industry structures; rather, these new ways emerged 
alongside of old ways (Frith 2001, 29). However, the new ways would never 
have existed and evolved into what we now know as the music industry today 
had there not been a demand for them among consumers. 
With the mass marketing of electrical goods, including the gramophone 
and eventually radios, a new industrial sector came to fruition, expanding the 
consumption of musical products beyond those who possessed musical 
talents to include everyone able to afford the hardware required to play 
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broadcast and pre-recorded music (Frith 2001,31). As a result, the owners of 
the rights to scores and recorded music received royalties from licensing rights 
for various performances, the private sales of recordings and public 
broadcasts on the radio (Frith 2001, 30). Even at its earliest stages, the record 
industry profiteers understood that it was necessary to produce demand as 
well as producing the supply, and consequently, companies such as the 
Compagnie Francaise du Gramophone organized free musical shows in 
numerous towns as early as 1907. Eventually, radio became little more than 
an auxiliary of the record industry (Attali 2002, 95). 
During the rise in popularity of the gramophone and the radio, the owners 
of record companies were not simply interested in producing the software to 
be played on the consumer furniture used to reproduce recordings; record 
company owners invested heavily in developing the hardware that they were 
dependent upon for the communication of recordings (Negus 1992, 23). This 
phenomenon has been described by Pekka Gronow (1983,55): 
The leading companies owed a considerable part of their success to 
technological innovation. They were not just record companies, they 
had to produce complete systems of recording technology. For the 
consumer, they offered both recordings and the equipment to play 
them on (and a critical observer of the cabinet phonographs of the 
1910's might say that records were a sideline to help the sale of 
furniture). For the industry itself they had to develop recording 
equipment, mastering processes and presses. 
Record companies acquired and merged with electronic companies in 
order to gain patents for new technologies, such as the merger in 1931 of the 
Gramophone Company and Columbia Gramophone to create EMI (Electrical 
and Musical Industries Ltd.) (Negus 1992, 23). 
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Beyond allowing music to be retrieved as it was written, recording 
technology allowed music to be retrieved as it was performed, making possible 
the commercialization of folk music (Frith 2001,31). By folk music I am 
referring to the music that followed oral traditions and that was born out of 
vernacular improvisation, as opposed to notated music which involved 
composing, arranging and learning music according to composers' scores 
(Frith 2001, 31). As Simon Frith states: 
... if initial recordings were just that, records of really happening 
studio events, they became sonic compositions, studio-created 
works that had never actually been performed and often couldn't 
be- whether a concoction of doctored noise like the Beatles' Sgt 
Pepper or Glenn Gould's spliced together 'perfect' version of a 
Goldberg variation ... To make a record was to make something 
quite new; no longer to pursue 'fidelity' to an original 'live' event 
(Frith 2001, 31-2). 
Many genres, such as blues and jazz, were dependent upon recording and 
broadcast technology, because they are not music that is playedfrom scores 
and are commonly improvised (Frith 2001, 31). 
Recently, the music industry has undergone another technological 
revolution: digital technology has not only changed the ways in which music is 
stored and recorded, but also the ways in which it can be distributed (Frith 
2001, 32). This will be examined in greater detail later in this chapter. 
This brief historical survey of the symbiotic relationship between 
technology and the music industry serves to establish the fact that, since the 
beginnings of the music industry, record companies have sought to exert 
control over both the software associate with musical recordings and the 
hardware technology necessary to reproduce them (Negus 1992, 23). This 
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tendency continues today in an unprecedented degree of control through the 
process of vertical integration. 
Before going on to discuss how the current structure of the music 
industry has become an oligopoly, it is necessary to understand what types of 
companies are involved and to what degree they are capable of exerting 
control over the processes of signing new acts, acquiring rights to music, 
marketing and promoting acts, and distributing music. 
Revenues from the global sales of recorded music reached around 
$36 billion in the mid-1990s, and over three-quarters of these revenues 
belonged to the 'majors' (Lovering 1998, 40). The majors are multinational 
corporations, usually belonging to a conglomerate, who control the production, 
manufacturing, distribution, marketing and promotion of the recordings of their 
signed artists; in others words, they are fully integrated firms (Fenster & Swiss 
1999, 229-30). As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 'majors' that exist 
today are EMI, Sony-BMG, Warner Music Group, and Vivendi Universal. 
These companies are themselves owned by larger companies, which have 
interests encompassing a range of leisure and entertainment media, electronic 
and industrial manufacturing and firms providing domestic products and 
services (Negus 1992, 2). Although it has now been spun off as a separate 
enterprise, EMI was, for many years, owned by the British-based company 
Thorn-EMI, which has interests in lighting, the rental of domestic appliances, 
musical and electrical retail outlets, security systems, computer software and 
electronic technology. Sony Music (now part of Sony-BMG) is a division of the 
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Japanese Sony Corporation, a leading manufacturer of domestic and industrial 
audio and visual products, semiconductors, telecommunications equipment 
and the owner of Columbia Pictures in Hollywood. BMG Music is a subsidiary 
of the Bertelsmann group of Germany which, despite maintaining a low 
corporate profile, was the largest media conglomerate prior to the Time-
Warner merger in 1989. Bertelsmann's interests include newspapers, 
magazine and book publishing, record clubs and cable television networks. 
Warner Music is part of the AOL-Time-Warner conglomerate which is one of 
the largest entertainment corporations in the world with interests in film, cable, 
television and publishing. Universal Music was once owned by Canada's 
Seagram corporation, but is now a subsidiary of the French media and utilities 
conglomerate, Vivendi. 
However, as Negus (1999) has pointed out elsewhere, attempts to profile 
the majors are almost always thwarted by the constant restructuring of 
corporations through mergers and sales of subsidiaries (35). Ten years ago, 
there were six majors, including Polygram, then owned by the Dutch 
electronics firm, Phillips. In 1998, Seagrams bought Polygram for over $10 
billion and merged it with Universal/MCA to form the Universal Music Group 
(UMG) - then there were five. In the summer of 2000, Seagram sold UMG to 
Vivendi, along with its holdings in the Universal/MCA film production and 
distribution business. Then, in July 2004, Sony Music and BMG announced 
that they had merged reducing the Big 5 to the Big 4. This merger (which was 
temporarily blocked, at least in Europe, by the European Union's anti-
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monopoly regulator) makes Sony-BMG the second-largest record company in 
the world with 30 percent of the world music market and combined sales of 
more than $8 billion, according to Nielsen SoundScan, placing it just below 
Vivendi's Universal Music Group and ahead of Warner Music Group and EMI 
Group (Farache 2000). Many expect Universal to be bought up soon, although 
it seems unlikely for antitrust reasons and cash flow problems that any of the 
others will take over UMG; after all, Universal is the largest of the majors, and 
has been growing steadily in sales volume, even in the downturn that all 
recording companies have faced in recent years (Hannaford 2003). 
The histories and structures of each of the majors are long and involved 
(for a brief overview, see Bishop 2005). For the purposes of this thesis it is 
unnecessary to examine the details of the innumerable sales and acquisitions 
of companies by multinational corporations or the interests of their parent 
companies; but it is necessary to underline the breadth and scope of power 
possessed by the majors at this point. 
The process whereby the ownership of an area of production is 
increasingly aggregated into the hands of a small number of companies is 
referred to as concentration. Economists often use a formula to achieve a 
concentration ratio, which measures the degree of concentration within a 
particular sector by calculating the proportion of the market controlled by the 
top five firms in the sector (Longhurst 1995, 30). While the concentration ratio 
of an industry is used as an indicator of the relative size of leading firms in 
relation to the industry as a whole, market share is the percentage of the total 
market serviced by a firm or brand. Figure 2.1, below, taken from The 
Economist (2004), represents the market share held by each of the major 
record companies in the music industry in different parts of the world. 
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Although there are now four majors that dominate the market, it is not 
necessary for a single corporation to own everything in order to achieve 
monopoly power; an oligopoly exists in the music industry today, which means 
that anyone of the ruling companies, acting alone, can alter market conditions 
(Bagdikian 2004,5). 
While it is not a recent phenomenon that the music industry is dominated 
by a small number of large companies (Negus 1992, 2), over the past 20 years 
there have been important developments in the structure and operations of the 
majors (Fenster & Swiss 1999, 230). The majors have drastically increased in 
both size and scope by acquiring smaller domestic and international music 
labels and music publishing companies (Fenster and Swiss 1999, 230). This is 
what is known as vertical integration: buying out companies involved in other 
layers of the same market. When a company expands vertically, it takes over 
several of those levels of intermediation in order to maximize control and 
minimize dependence on other companies that have their own interests. 
Vertical integration ensures that "oligopolistic concentration of the record 
industry [is] maintained by control of the total production flow from raw 
materials to wholesale sales" (Peterson & Berger 1975, 143). Vertical 
integration in the music industry is intended to maximize control over three 
crucial areas, in addition to the core business of production: musical supply 
Figure 2.1 
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Another development within the organization of the industry is that the 
trend towards consolidation of the majors within multinational conglomerates 
has become remarkably common over the past 15 years or so. This process is 
the result of large companies seeking to expand their control over the market 
by expanding horizontally through the purchases of other, parallel companies. 
For example, the following is a list of some of the smaller record labels owned 
by each of the majors: 
Sony-BMG: Arista, Columbia, Epic, J Records, Jive, LaFace, 
Legacy, Provident Music Group, RCA, RCA Victor Group, RLG -
Nashville, SONY BMG Masterworks, Sony Music Nashville, Sony 
Urban Music, Sony Wonder, So So Def, Verity 
EMI: Capitol, EMI, Blue Note, Parlophone, Angel, Chrysalis, 
Virgin, Caroline, Back Porch, Higher Octave, Sparrow, Manhattan, 
Forefront, Shakti, Additive, Heavenly 
Warner: Atlantic, Atco, Elektra, Asylum, Reprise, Maverick, 
Rhino, Sire, Warner Brothers, Bad Boy, Lava, East West, Nonesuch, 
Warner Nashville, Warner Jazz, Warner Music International 
Universal: Barclay, Geffen Records, Island Def Jam Music 
Group, Mercury, Polydor, Universal Motown, Decca, Deutsche 
Grammophone, Universal Music Latino, Universal Music Nashville, 
Verve Music Group 
Such lists serve to demonstrate that, although there appears to be a wide 
variety of labels in the market catering to consumer tastes, the vast majority of 
profits in the industry are funneled back to the four major corporations which 
own all these labels. 
Another effect of consolidation is that the multinational parent companies 
reap the profits from a range of different products, as they have diversified into 
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other activities in the music industry and into other media (Fenster & Swiss 
1999, 230). This process of diversification facilitates the maintenance of 
overall profits even when individual sectors suffer due to factors such as falling 
demand, as the income from one sector can 'cushion' the losses from another 
(Longhurst 1995,32). Accordingly, the amount of capital gained through 
diversification, combined with the established global infrastructure of 
multinational corporations, allows the majors to produce, promote and 
distribute artists internationally (Fenster & Swiss 1999, 231). Furthermore, the 
diversification of interests by multinational corporations have lead to the 
increasing possibility of 'media synergy', which Negus (1992,5) has described 
as "a strategy of diversifying into directly related technologies and areas of 
entertainment and using the opportunities that this provides for extending the 
exposure of specific pieces of music and artists." Synergy is not only important 
for multinational corporations as a means to promote artists or as a means for 
artists to promote other products, it is also a recognition of the inter-
connectedness of media technology (videos, CD's, DVD's, computers, and 
digital technology in general) in the form of the home entertainment system as 
well as a play on a contemporary buzzword, 'multimedia' (Negus 1992, 5). 
Consequently, major labels have a predilection for artists who can fulfill 
the role of a spokesperson for the company. As Negus (1992, 1) has stated: 
The major labels involved in recording popular music are no longer 
merely seeking local musicians, singers or songwriters. The 
phonogram industry ... is concerned with developing global 
personalities which can be communicated across multiple media; 
through recordings, videos, films, television, magazines, books and 
via advertising, product endorsement and sponsorship over a range 
of consumer merchandise. The quest is for entertainment icons 
whose sounds and images can be inserted into the media and 
communication networks which are spanning the globe. 
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The changing scope of the majors has a profound effect on the ways in which 
music is produced, distributed and consumed and, consequently, has altered 
the relationship between the majors and independent record companies 
(Fenster & Swiss 1999, 230). 
"Indies" are record labels that produce recorded music and remain 
independent from the major labels to varying degrees (Fenster & Swiss 1999, 
231). As a result of vertical integration within the industry, remaining purely 
independent from the majors is a difficult and costly task. It is for this reason 
that many academics have eschewed the 'reductionisf tendency to discuss 
indies and majors in terms of a dichotomy (Negus 1999; Burnett 1996). 
Furthermore, the dichotomy tends to imbue both types of companies with 
ideological connotations: the indies are associated with innovation, grassroots, 
and being in it for the love of music, whereas the majors are associated with 
homogeneity, inauthenticity and being in it for the love of money. For many 
academics writing about the music industry, the dichotomous model of indies 
vs. the majors has become understood as a romantic approach to the political 
economy of the industry (Negus 1992,16). 
But this dichotomy has also been described as misleading, since the 
recording industry is actually a network of major and minor companies 
operating symbiotically (Negus 1992, 18). The majors often invest funds into 
small, independent companies and enter into joint ventures and licensing 
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deals with them, and furthermore, indies produce music with the aim of selling 
it on the worldwide commercial markets, not unlike the majors (Negus 1992, 
17-8). as a result, certain major record companies have created 'fake' indie 
labels (often called 'boutique labels') in order to earn some 'street cred' with 
the youth and subculture markets (Negus 1992, 16). Additionally, assisted by 
the media, a trend has developed over the past few years whereby the term 
indie has been associated with a particular style or sub-genre of music, rather 
than a political economic position, which has also helped majors to capitalize 
on this 'buzzword' that had become so hip with the youth market. 
A key observation, underlined in a great deal of academic writing on this 
topic, is that the indies are extremely valuable to the music industry as a 
whole because they tend to invest in forms of music not catered to or 
constrained by the demands of the mainstream music market (Burnett 1996; 
Shuker 2001; Peterson & Berger 1975; Lovering 1998). So, while the 
relationship between indies and the majors may be a symbiotic one, it is 
unevenly so, as often the majors simply ignore the indies, allowing them to 
operate on the fringes of the industry until it makes financial sense for the 
majors to invest in them. As John Lovering has noted (1998, 37): 
... if a new musical product turns out to be commercially promising, 
the larger corporations are generally better placed to benefit from 
this promise. The costs and risks of raising products to the world 
scale can be insurmountable for small companies, many of which 
collapse when their acts become sufficiently sales-worthy to be 
lured away by a major. A good part, probably the majority, of the 
repertoire of the Big Five corporations [sic] is made up of music that 
developed in independents. 
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Indies are left to perform the role of A&R ('audience and repertoire') for the 
majors - that is, the unearthing, signing and recording of new talent - along 
with the production of masters and mapping new markets (Frith 2001, 49). 
Ian Lavsky is a musician and co-owner of Constellation Records in 
Montreal as well as co-owner of La Sala Rossa and Casa del Popolo (show 
venues in Montreal). In a personal conversation, Lavsky described the 
process and costs involved in starting up the label and opening the venues. 
We've never had a grant, although some of our artists have 
benefited from FACTOR support for touring, where the bands are 
applying on their own behalf and Constellation is providing 
supporting documentation or sometimes clears cheques and so on. 
We have wrestled over the last 8 years with the issue, every once in 
awhile thinking 'Boy, we should really grab some of this money 
that's floating around'. I think I've kind of, for various principled 
reasons as well as various bureaucratic reasons, not been 
interested in pursuing that and have luckily never been forced to by 
cash flow or growth or lack thereof. 
So when I say that we've never had funding, we've never gone 
to a government agency and we've been fortunate enough to have 
people here and there that have been able to float us $5000. In fact 
we once took out a loan of $10,000. From the government's 
perspective we're an export company - we make all these units of 
things and 85-90% of them get sold outside of Canada, which is 
that little indie rock distribution world that exists, that is fairly well 
anchored in Western Europe and in North America, and if we were 
to write some kind of financial prospectus about ourselves, we 
would probably just card ourselves as some kind of boutique label 
with a very small but dedicated following worldwide and enough 
awareness amongst the indie rock community that our stuff tends to 
get reviewed and we barely have to lift a finger to do it. What that 
has done though is spelled a very low threshold for sales, and 
we've just always been comfortable staying below it. 
The theme of investing personal savings and having little to no 'business' 
experience is a recurring one among many musicians and small business 
owners in the music industry - at least according to many band interviews that 
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I have read throughout the past few years as well as conversations that I have 
had with friends, colleagues and acquaintances that work in the industry. In 
the media one often hears about the successes amongst them, i.e., the bands 
and labels that have broken through and have achieved some level of success 
and/or public recognition, but there are no doubt a great deal of 'failures' for 
each success. Ian Lavsky further elaborated: 
I mean, we were lucky, and maybe something about the relative 
speed at which things evolved for us ... how early on in the game we 
had to ask ourselves the question: could we turn this into something 
that wasn't just a bedroom art project? The strange thing is that we 
had had this vague business model - we thought about what we 
would charge for the vegetarian food and the beer we were going to 
sell, and thought 'if we get 50 people a night for five nights and then 
100 people on the weekend ... '. We were thinking in terms of 
numbers and spreadsheets and so on with respect to this 
cafe/performance space idea, so we carry that over to the label 
knowing full well that the economics of something like that are sort 
of absurd for such a tiny amount of money as 'a startup.' You're not 
generating cash for months, and obviously that's one of the first 
hurdles that anybody who's going to build a small, arts distribution 
or manufacturing and distribution entity. Whether it's a record label 
or whatever else, that's dependent on retail, is going to come up 
against immediately is that you're the first person to payout money 
and the last to get paid. That gap, if you're lucky, is 6 months and 
can often be 9 or 12. The people running bedroom labels tend to 
have a job that they like or some other source of income that's 
comfortable for them, and tend to operate on the principle that 'I'll 
pay for the next record out of at least getting my money back on the 
first record.' ... 1 know lots of people who have put out records that 
way, and once it's up and running it's great. We differ, I think, very 
little from that model in the sense that we've never tried to put out 
more records in a year than we could handle, or more records in a 
year than we thought made sense for reasons that often have 
nothing to do with growth or trying to be at the top of any pyramid, 
local or otherwise. 
While it may be accurate to describe the 'independent' nomenclature as 
misleading, it is necessary to bear in mind that as a result of vertical 
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integration in the industry, independent firms are left with the choice of 
receiving limited distribution, or creating relationships with the majors in order 
to work within the established structures of the corporate firms (Fenster & 
Swiss 1999, 232). As Negus (1999, 58) has noted: 
The multi-divisional major companies do not attract the owners of 
small independent labels by being knowledgeable about music, 
funky, cool, street-wise or artist-friendly. The major corporation 
attracts the indie because it can distribute recordings. Here the 
tensions between indie and major do not so much involve conflicts 
of art versus commerce or democracy versus oligopoly . . . as 
distribution struggles - battles to get recordings to the public. 
Distribution plays a pivotal role in developing and marketing the music of 
artists and labels, and the two tiers of the music industry have been historically 
linked through the majors' control of distribution (Shuker 2001, 48). The 
function of the distributor is that of moving products from the record labels to 
the retailers, generally obtaining the rights to catalogs for a limited period of 
time to market and sell the products. The main advantages of using 
distributors is that they handle the time and costs involved with financing and 
organizing the production, manufacturing, marketing and distribution of 
recordings (LeBlanc 2003). The four majors distribute their own records, as 
well as those produced by their affiliates and foreign-owned independent 
labels through their established multinational distribution systems. 
While there are independent distributors, often the benefits of being 
distributed by the major multinational firms outweigh those of using 
independent distributors. Alexander Mair, the president of MHL 
Communications in Toronto, which is a company that develops business plans 
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and strategies for the music industry and government agencies, has stated the 
following concerning distribution: 
The smaller [the label] the more it looks to its distributor for services 
and the more the distributor charges them. Canadian-owned 
(independent) distributors can supply some sales efforts on their 
behalf, like co-op advertising, but they can't do marketing or 
promotion competitively. There are (independent) promotion and 
marketing people for hire but they don't get the same respect from 
radio, MuchMusic or retail accounts as the people who work for the 
big five. (Cited in LeBlanc 2003) 
On the topic of distribution, Ian Lavsky, of Constellation Records, stated: 
Our marketing budgets end up being extremely low, and mostly get 
rolled out in an often misguided attempt to satisfy distributors. The 
industry has never been more competitive and more cluttered. 
There's certainly been all kinds of retrenchments going on, and it's 
a combination of factors... People are increasingly price-sensitive, 
especially as more of them have computers and realize they can 
access most of this music for free. And it's not the same consumer 
culture in Europe either, it's not quite as easy, everything costs 
more. So, distributors like a lot of other people in the chain, the 
worst offenders being the 'box' stores, try and basically nickel and 
dime you for everything and ask you ultimately to do their marketing 
for them. 
Individual labels are increasingly dependent upon the market research 
produced by distributors as the distribution division influences the number of 
recordings that will be pressed and shipped (Negus 1999, 59). A prinCipal 
concern for the indies is to ensure that they do not manufacture too many 
copies of any particular recording, since this is quite costly (as a result of 
possessing a stagnant product and fees from the distributor for stocking the 
product) that could have been invested in other areas such as production and 
artist development (Negus 1999, 57). As Jonathan Rees, VP of product at 
HMV Canada, has noted, "with a multinational, an independent label is always 
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going to be the 10th or 11th tier down" (LeBlanc 2003), so it is not a priority for 
major distributors to push the products of the indie labels they represent 
unless sales figures indicate otherwise. 
Although the major/indie dichotomy may be technically inaccurate, the 
major firms still shape the nature of the organizational networks of alliances 
between the large and small firms, allowing the large multinationals the 
advantage of gaining access to a variety of material and artists, the 
commercial impact of which are closely monitored (Negus 1992, 18) and re-
appropriated according to the whims of the commercial market without having 
to invest in the development of new artists. This 'symbiotic relationship' is what 
effectively ensures the majors' oligopoly over the market, and therefore "the 
power and control of the music industry is ... better understood in terms of the 
co-optation and absorption of new music than in terms of a model that 
suggests the direct control and manipulation of public tastes" (Burnett 1996, 
61). 
The exploitation of the international market has proven to be indispensable 
for record companies for its tendency to provide extra income for 
proportionately less additional investment (Negus 1999, 155). Also, having 
offices and/or subsidiaries in offices around the world (as the majors do) allow 
the large firms to jump on the next big trend, even if it emerges in small 
countries, such as Bob Marley in Jamaica and Abba in Sweden (Wallis & 
Maim 1984, 105). The mUltinationals have the resources to launch acts 
internationally, and the enormous impact these firms have on the global music 
37 
industry is a result of their control of and access to a range of types of media 
and distribution, thereby allowing opportunities for cross-marketing and 
strategies for synergy (LeBlanc 2003). 
The main concern of the majors is marketing and advertising (Lovering 
1998, 36), and therefore the trend in the music industry today seems to be that 
the old A&R functions of record companies are no longer viable in today 
commercial climate (Shuker 2001, 72). Consequently, the majors strive to 
garner the largest share of the single mass market by marketing products 
which appeal to a large percentage of the population without offending any 
major groups (Peterson & Berger 1975, 159). It is obviously the dream of any 
record label to stumble upon the next reincarnation of the Beatles, as a large 
organization generally makes more money selling one million copies of one 
album, rather than selling ten thousand copies of one hundred albums (Wallis 
& Maim 1984, 85). A consequence of this type of strategy is a reluctance to 
experiment with new types of music and the avoidance of risk-taking (Negus 
1999,52). However, through their relationships with indies the majors are no 
longer caught off-guard by vast commercial interest in a new type of music 
and can react to the changing nuances of consumer taste by buying out 
artists' contracts or acquiring entire labels (Peterson & Berger 1975, 169). This, 
however, seems to be increasingly less common. 
Patricia Elliott works for Trade Routes, a program of the federal 
Department of Canadian Heritage which is aimed at providing funding and 
resources for companies in the cultural industries including music and new 
media. In an interview, Elliott stated: 
Artists are becoming more and more business savvy so they want 
to keep control over their management. So I think what you see is a 
lot of artists that are signed to an indie label but they'll get 
distribution through Universal or Warner. They rely on the big 
machine to help them get their music out there but they're staying 
with a small independent label in terms of management. Most of 
them won't sign up with a major label because it's not a guarantee 
anymore and you're more likely to get a more personalized service 
through a small independent label as your manager than you are if 
you get signed into the big shop. And I know a lot of artists that are 
managed by one label and distributed by another, so it's not like a 
one stop shopping, and they might even have their publishing done 
under another label. 
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Many of the major labels are looking to new formats to revive the slumping 
sales of CD's, in much the same way as the commercial innovation of the CD 
in 1983 helped to revive the market (Lovering 1998, 38). Corporate executives 
seem to agree that the majors have a creative problem: Alain Levy, chairman 
and chief executive of EMI Music, told Billboard magazine that "too many 
recent acts have been one-hit wonders and that the industry is not developing 
durable artists". According to Tom Calderone, executive vice-president of 
music and talent for MTV, Viacom's music channel, "the days of watching a 
band develop slowly over time with live performances are over" (The 
Economist 2004). A poll by Rolling Stone magazine found that fans believe 
that relatively few "great" albums have been produced recently and people are 
less excited about the record industry's products, which is one explanation for 
shrinking CD sales (The Economist 2004). 
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The major record companies have attempted to rectify these problems 
through various strategies. For example, in 2003 Universal lowered the price 
on all its major releases. According the website of CIRPA (the Canadian 
Independent Record Producers Association), "labels are decreasing album 
prices of specific albums especially those by new artists to stimulate sales; 
offering rebates; repackaging back catalogue and selling the content as new 
releases; creating DVD divisions; experimenting with dual-sided CDIDVD 
formats and encouraging artists to create visual content for future video 
releases" (CIRPA, no date). 
Distributors also Significantly influence the product carried by major 
retailers. Every month, distributors must establish a priority of releases and 
marketing campaigns to go along with the products (LeBlanc 2003). Retailers 
are more likely to buy large quantities of those recordings that receive loads of 
advertising and promotion; moreover, such bulk purchases usually involve 
rebate programs or special retail campaigns, which indie labels can rarely do, 
relegating their recordings to back-row racks or not being carried by major 
retailers at all (LeBlanc 2003). Steve Kane, the Managing Director of Warner 
Music Canada in 2003, remarked "We are in the age of pricing and positioning. 
I can afford to put Faith Hill within 10 feet of the door in any store in this 
country. Can an indie label do that with their product?" (LeBlanc 2003). As a 
result of slowing sales and rising distribution costs, retailers are maintaining 
tight control over inventories and are trying to avoid having excess product on 
the shelves for an extended period of time. Furthermore, as a result of 
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pressure from retailers, record labels now allow retailers to return unsold 
products, which also contributes to distributors being reluctant to press too 
many copies of recordings by artists without proven track records (Negus 1999, 
56). 
The appearance of the Internet has had a significant impact on the 
'traditional' structure of the music industry. As Timothy Taylor has observed: 
"the advent of digital technology in the early 1980's marks the beginning of 
what may be the most fundamental change in the history of Western music 
since the invention of music notation in the ninth century" (Taylor 2001,3). 
Previously, all modes of music distribution were physical; however, with digital 
technology music can be recorded, endlessly copied without losing fidelity or 
quality, and can be transmitted electronically over the Internet to an infinite 
number of people, for free (Taylor 2001,4). Clearly, this is viewed as a threat 
to the established order of the industry, and the multinationals have reacted 
accordingly. 
Initially, it was the music retailers, and not the record companies, that 
were the first to denounce the Internet and the downloading of music as a 
potential threat to sales (Jones 2002,219). By 1999, "MP3" had replaced the 
word 'pornography' as the most widely used target for search engines (Carey 
& Wall 2001, 35), and in 2001, for the first time, blank CD's outsold pre-
recorded ones (Teachout 2002,57). 
Towards the beginning of the MP3 boom, record company executives 
resisted any accommodation with the new technology (Barbrook 2002,277). 
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Not only was the technology resisted by the multinationals, it was attacked. 
Record companies, and even a few musicians (such as Metallica), attempted 
to brand MP3s and peer to peer (P2P) file-sharing as the death of popular 
music, since they allowed people to 'steal' artistic property (Carey & Wall 2001, 
35). In a widely publicized case, the RIM (Recording Industry Association of 
America) sued Napster, a music file-sharing P2P site, for infringing on 
copyright laws. Napster argued that it did not participate in music piracy 
because none of the music files were actually on its server; rather, the music 
comes directly from other users on the server (Carey & Wall 2001, 45). 
However, Napster was held liable for damages, and the site was successfully 
shut down, although many other similar sites sprang up shortly thereafter such 
as Gnutella, Aimster, Morpheus and Freenet (Carey & Wall 2001, 45). 
Ironically, the highly publicized case only served to advertise P2P programs 
and MP3s, taking the downloading of music from a relatively small group of 
users to an international phenomenon. In May of 2003, a Music/ab survey 
found that 20 million individuals claimed to have downloaded music from the 
Internet (Holland 2004, 6). Nevertheless, some studies found that a majority of 
people who download MP3s simply do so to sample the music before 
purchasing the actual CD (Carey & Wall 2001, 45). Findings such as this 
support claims made by pro-MP3 campaigners, who believe that MP3 'piracy' 
can simply be accounted for in record company budgets as marketing 
expenses, based on the fact that it frequently results in an eventual sale 
(Carey & Wall 2001, 46). 
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The popularity of MP3s and P2P file-sharing programs grew so quickly 
and exponentially that within a span of about two years the multinationals 
became sufficiently threatened, not only by the potential loss of profit, but by 
the potential loss of control over the state of the industry. In the face of this 
turbulent shift in distributive practices, the recording industry attempted to use 
what it perceived to be its only weapon against the erosion of its monopolies of 
distribution: recourse to the courts to guarantee the protection of intellectual 
property rights. This may be perceived as contrary, given the majors' long 
history of exploiting the rights of their artists in order to improve their own 
'bottom line' (Jones 2002,218). According to some critics, therefore, the 
lawsuits filed by the record industry, against servers and users alike, were 
actually meant to slow down the consumption of music on the Internet so that 
major corporations could have more time to figure out how to control it, and 
were not concerned with protecting the intellectual property rights of the artists, 
as they have claimed (Carey & Wall 2001 ,43). 
As much as the record industry has feared the potential loss of 
profits from the on-line distribution of music, another great threat posed by this 
new technology to the music business is that artists no longer necessarily 
need to sign contracts with the majors to ensure worldwide distribution. Carey 
and Wall (2001) have stated that "it could be argued that MP3 is far more 
transformative than the previous format changes and marketing revolutions in 
that it changes the relationship between artist and record company" (35). The 
Internet provides a practical mode of distributing music to a mass audience 
43 
without the need for the oligopolistic model used by the majors. This is 
appealing for those artists who have "a creative, financial or political aversion 
to dealing with the music industry" (Hayward 1995, 33). Many indie labels view 
the Internet as an indispensable tool; however, many artists (unknown and 
popular alike) have come to realize that many of the traditional functions of 
record companies, such as marketing and distribution, cannot simply be 
replicated through the Internet (LeBlanc 2003). According to a 2002 survey by 
the London-based media information provider, Informa Media Group, sales of 
digital music will remain a niche sector and are expected to account for only 
1.2% of the global total of music sales by the end of the decade (LeBlanc 
2003). 
The reluctance on the part of academics to discuss the independent and 
major record labels in terms of a dichotomy seems to be attributable in large 
measure to a postmodern approach to cultural studies that refuses to take any 
kind of moral stand in order to refer to anything as 'good' or 'bad' (Lovering 
1998, 32). This academic approach is increasingly distanced from the popular 
discourse about indie music among fans, musicians and music industry 
personnel alike. In an article entitled 'The Problem with Music' (a.k.a. 'Some of 
your friends are probably already this fucked') excerpted from the Maximum 
Rock n' Roll website, Steve Albini (an influential guitarist, producer and music 
journalist) colourfully describes a band about to sign a contract with a major 
record label in the following way: 
I imagine a trench, about four feet wide and five feet deep, maybe 
sixty yards long, filled with runny, decaying shit. I imagine these 
people, some of them good friends, some of them barely 
acquaintances, at one end of this trench. I also imagine a faceless 
industry lackey at the other end, holding a fountain pen and a 
contract waiting to be signed. 
Nobody can see what's printed on the contract. It's too far away, 
and besides, the shit stench is making everybody's eyes water. The 
lackey shouts to everybody that the first one to swim the trench gets 
to sign the contract. Everybody dives in the trench and they struggle 
furiously to get to the other end. Two people arrive simultaneously 
and begin wrestling furiously, clawing each other and dunking each 
other under the shit. Eventually, one of them capitulates, and there's 
only one contestant left. He reaches for the pen, but the Lackey 
says, 'Actually, I think you need a little more development. Swim it 
again, please. BaCkstroke.' 
Albini goes on to present some typical costs that appear in major recording 
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contracts, including the manager's cut, legal fees, producer's advance, music 
video production, new 'fancy' equipment costs, tour bus rental, and so on: "The 
band is now 114 of the way through its contract, has made the music industry 
more than 3 million dollars richer, but is in the hole $14,000 on royalties. The 
band members have each earned about 113 as much as they would working at 
a 7-11, but they got to ride in a tour bus for a month" (Albini, "The Problem with 
Music," no date). 
I have included this example, not to imply that signing a contract with an 
indie label is necessarily better for a band, but to demonstrate the type of 
rhetoric that is becoming progressively more common amongst musicians and 
fans alike - that is, that the major labels are increasingly associated in popular 
discourse with the exploitation, rather than the development, of musicians. 
In my research, I spoke with Pierre Carpentier, the general manager of 
FACTOR, the Foundation to Assist Canadian Talent on Record, one of the 
most important agencies (funded by both the government and the private 
sector) providing financial assistance to Canadian musicians. In this 
conversation, Carpentier addressed the dilemma faced by Canadian artists 
whether to sign with major labels or to pursue the 'indie' route: 
There are many artists that go on to a successful career and they 
may never sign to a multinational. I think recording artists are being 
more savvy now. The artists are more likely to own the copyright 
and they will license it to someone for a specific period of time and 
at the end of the day, that ownership reverts back to the artists. 
Look at a band such as Blue Rodeo - they own the copyright to 
every one of their recordings. loreena McKennitt does as well. 
There are quite a few that have moved on to bigger and better 
things and they still own the copyright of their recording. And that 
might not have been the case a dozen years ago. So I think there's 
more to it than just playing music and plodding ahead blindly. I think 
artists are more and more so taking their career into their own 
hands and saying, 'if I do sign directly, I don't own my copyright and 
that can be shooting myself in the foot.'" 
So, is it discouraging to see someone work through the system 
and then eventually hit international fame and sign directly? Well I 
think we can be proud about taking that artist to the level where 
they achieved that success. I don't think that that's something which 
we should be ashamed of. 
If some artists can maintain control over their artistic product, and achieve 
national or international success, by following the 'indie' strategy - and 
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loreena McKennitt, mentioned by Pierre Carpentier, would be an outstanding 
example of such success - then what is the appeal of signing to a major label? 
Some music industry insiders even go as far as to say that the role of major 
labels is becoming obsolete. Meyer Billurcu, a musician and co-owner of Blue 
Skies Turn Black, a promotions/record label based in Montreal, claimed: 
Well the thing is, it's like the whole idea of a label is almost 
becoming obsolete because aI/ a major label can really offer a band 
now is promotion, and spend a lot of money on advertising which an 
indie label can't do. The actual making of records has become so 
cheap that anyone can do it, and with the internet and online stores 
it's really easy to self music. It seems that, and we actually had a 
meeting about this a couple of weeks ago, the main revenue for 
bands and for music right now is going to come from touring, from 
live shows, because you can't rely on the record sales anymore. So 
we've noticed that a lot more bands are touring a lot more than they 
used to. They just have to do it now because that's the only way 
that they can make money. So it's weird ... are majors even going to 
be needed in a couple of years? They're just going to become 
advertising companies. 
From the point of view of music fans, there has been a proliferation in the 
number of websites and online magazines devoted to 'exposing the truth' 
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behind the record industry and the oligopoly held by the majors (for examples, 
see Jeriko One or Oligopolywatch in "References - Electronic Sources," 
below). At the same time, new internet-based technologies have permitted 
both musicians and fans new possibilities. Musicians can use the internet to 
promote their music and live performances and to sell their music directly to 
consumers. At the same time, consumers may share music files and 
downloads in order to gain access to music which, in the popular view, had 
been increasingly priced beyond the interest level or purchasing power of the 
average consumer. While the major record companies, and the transnational 
conglomerates that own them, have assumed increasingly dominant positions 
in the 'legal' sale of popular music, and numerous music-related activities, 
over the past ten to twenty years, new technologies which emphasize 
'consumer sovereignty' have emerged to challenge the hegemonic position of 
the 'Big 4.' 
In this chapter I have provided an overview of the current structure of the 
global music industry in order to demonstrate the degree to which the major 
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record companies control the market, and in turn, how the economic and 
industrial structures of the recording industry influence what music consumers 
hear, and the form in which they hear it. I have also indicated that recent 
technological innovations (most notably the internet, MP3 storage and P2P 
file-sharing software) and changes in consumer behaviour pose a challenge to 




The Canadian Music Industry 
In chapter 2, I presented a general overview of the current structure of the 
global music industry. As I have demonstrated, the majors maintain their 
market position by controlling music supply (the role of A&R), distribution and 
marketing. In this chapter I will discuss how the monopolization of these three 
sectors specifically affects the Canadian music industry. 
Canada's music industry has existed for over 100 years, since the 
inception of the Berliner Gramophone Company in Montreal in 1898 (LeBlanc 
2003). The recording industry thrived in Canada until the depression in the 
1930's, after which only Compo Company and RCA Victor were left (LeBlanc 
2003). From the 1950's to the end of the 60's, the Canadian recording industry 
was relatively underdeveloped and chaotic, and most of the Canadian-owned 
music companies were not so much record labels, engaged in signing artists 
and producing master tapes, as they were record pressing companies or 
distributors (Straw 1993, 56), These companies would use the profits incurred 
from pressing masters from the U.S. to invest into the production of new 
recordings for Canadian artists, which were often licensed to other companies 
for release in foreign countries (Straw 1993, 56). Small firms in Canada were 
largely dependent upon material originating in the U.S. (Straw 1993,56). 
However, the large U.S. firms saw the emergence of the Canadian market as 
advantageous due to the retail similarities between both countries, and as the 
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U.S. music market grew, so did the Canadian market (LeBlanc 2003). In the 
1970's, the U.S. major firms began establishing branch distribution networks 
across Canada (Straw 1993, 56), which were fully owned agencies that could 
distribute records to retail outlets from coast to coast (Straw 1996,102). 
The restructuring that took place in Canada as a result of the multinational 
setting up branch systems mirrored the industry restructuring that was 
occurring in the U.S. contemporaneously. In the late 60's, there was a wave 
of mergers that occurred between major record companies in the States that 
led to the consolidation of the channels of distribution, leading to an even 
greater amount of industry concentration (Straw 1996, 102). Already, at this 
early stage of industry concentration, the A&R role of the major record 
companies was neglected in favor of establishing networks of distribution, and 
the large firms sought out agreements or purchases of small record labels to 
ensure a steady supply of new music (Straw 1996, 102). By establishing 
branch plants in many countries, the major multinational firms were able to 
"better gauge the distinctiveness of national tastes and sign emerging 
performers" (Straw 1996, 102). However, in the case of Canada, the 
establishment of branch plants (Canadian subsidiaries for all the major labels) 
is more a result of attempting to avoid paying tariffs on imported recordings 
which was a major factor until the signing of the Free Trade Agreement (Straw 
1996, 102). 
As the distribution oligopoly took hold in Canada and the U.S., the 
Canadian-owned manufacturers and distributors began to degenerate, and 
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furthermore, corporate consolidation in the U.S. meant that many independent 
firms were unable to negotiate separate agreements with firms in Canada to 
license recordings, resulting in a decrease in private subsidies to produce 
Canadian recordings (Straw 1993, 57). By the mid-70s, as multinational firms 
extended their control over distribution and, to a lesser extent, record 
manufacturing, Canadian firms began springing up (such as Attic Records and 
True North), which were principally engaged in finding new talent and 
producing master tapes of new music (Straw 1996, 103). To feed the structure 
they had created, multinational firms turned to Canadian indies for products to 
distribute, thereby leading directly to the rise of the Canadian indie labels; 
where the multinationals showed little interest, Canadian indies were able to 
offer recording contracts (Straw 1996, 103). 
This, however, is no longer the case. Since the mid-'90s, fierce A&R 
competition from multinationals has impeded Canadian indies from signing 
new artists (LeBlanc 2003). As Bernie Finkelstein, the President of True North 
Records, has stated, 
When True North, Aquarius and Anthem started in the 70's there 
wasn't five aggressive multinationals or five major publishing 
companies signing acts in Canada. The majors weren't making 
Canadian records. The world was my oyster. From 1969 to 1980 I 
was able to sign Bruce Cockburn, Murray McLauchlan and Rough 
Trade. The majors weren't even interested. I couldn't do that today. 
(LeBlanc 2003) 
This being said, it is important to reiterate that the multinationals are not 
investing in discovering and nurturing new Canadian artists, unless there is a 
proven track record of being able to sell records and produce the kinds of 
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figures that would pique the majors' interest. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, when artists or bands demonstrate marketability, they are often 
bought up by the majors. Indies have come to represent the means by which 
the multinationals establish a connection to a national music culture without 
investing funds or allocating resources to the production of masters or the 
development of a fan base (Straw 1993, 60). Where the majors have actually 
made investments in developing Canadian talent, it is still evident that their 
main concern is maximizing the sale of products made by their parent 
company and affiliate (LeBlanc 2003). In the final event, the major labels' 
interest in Canadian talent is proving to have devastating effects on Canada's 
domestic recording industry as local firms cannot compete with the majors 
(and even some of the larger American indie labels) to attract Canadian artists, 
or for licensing agreements with foreign firms for rights to distribute their 
products (Straw 1996, 97). 
As the majors divest their A&R activities to the indies, their main concern 
has been, and continues to be, distribution. As a report by CIRPA documented, 
foreign-owned labels formerly involved in manufacturing or retail operations in 
Canada long ago abandoned these interests in order to concentrate on 
distribution (Straw 1993, 58), since a great percentage of profitability resides in 
this sector. In Canada, Universal Music is the leading distributor for 
independent Canadian music (LeBlanc 2003). 
The benefits of being distributed by a multinational firm often outweigh 
those of using independent distributors for Canadian indie labels (LeBlanc 
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2003). Distribution through a multinational has the advantage of benefiting 
from established coast-to-coast distribution networks, greater access to 
foreign markets, and favorable relationships with promotional outlets (Le. 
MuchMusic, radio stations) and retailers, which can often offer them deals and 
can guarantee substantial promotional activity. But there are many Canadian 
bands and artists who may sell between 5,000 and 10,000 albums; major 
distributors most likely will not be interested since sales of this volume are 
generally a loss for them, which is where the indie distributors come in. The 
leading indie distributors in Canada include Distribution Select, FAB 
Distribution, Sonic Distribution, DEP Distribution Exclusive, Distribution Fusion 
III, Madacy Entertainment Group and Scratch Recordings and Distribution. 
However, independent distribution in Canada has fallen on hard times 
within the past decade or so as a result of inability to compete effectively 
within the distribution networks established by the multinationals. According to 
Larry LeBlanc (2003): 
Since 1997, there have been the bankruptcies of such major 
distributors as Cargo Imports and Distribution in Montreal, Song 
Entertainment Distribution, and Quality Special Products, all based 
in Toronto; the closure of Denon Canada's distribution arm in 
Toronto; and the merging of Distribution Trans-Canada, with Select 
Distribution and GAM Distribution in Montreal. More recently, in 
April 2003, New York-based Pouschine Cook Capital Management 
purchased a majority stake in Montreal-based distributor St. Clair 
Entertainment. 
Nevertheless, some might argue that, as a result of the indie distributors' 
tendency to deal with labels and artists that are far from mainstream, and 
whose success are measured in thousands, or even hundreds of sales, selling 
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product to small independent retailers, they are not in fact in direct competition 
with the majors. Indie distributors deal with labels that have rosters of artists 
that work in genres that the majors generally don't pursue. While dealing with 
an independent distributor may offer an indie label more personalized attention 
and greater priority, this can often result in effectively being shut out of 
mainstream retail outlets and commercial radio airplay (LeBlanc 2003). Indie 
labels generally market albums that fall into genre categories that lie outside of 
the mainstream; consequently, they are often dealing with a different type of 
music consumer. 
Nevertheless, in the end they are still competing to a certain extent to 
procure a share of what is naturally a limited amount of disposable income 
from music fans. To do this requires effective marketing and promotion. A 
band such as Montreal's Arcade Fire - which signed to Merge Records, based 
in Chapel Hill, North Carolina - is an excellent example of how sufficient 
financial backing and a high level of attention and promotional effort from a 
record label can lead to 'commercial' success. Having garnered airplay on 
commercial radio and MTV, the band's debut album Funeral sold more than 
130,000 copies according to SoundScan, which is remarkable for an indie 
debut; it displaced Neutral Milk Hotel's In the Aeroplane Over the Sea as 
Merge Records' best-selling album ever (Mehr 2005). Arcade's Fire's follow-
up album, Neon Bible, released in 2007, achieved even greater critical acclaim 
and commercial success. 
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In addition to the multinationals competing against local labels to sign local 
artists, the major record companies have also become more aggressive in 
trying to capture foreign-owned independent labels for distribution in Canada. 
In recent years, Canada has become an attractive market for foreign-owned 
indie labels as it tends to be quite responsive to their catalogs of alternative 
rock, jazz, roots and blues (LeBlanc 2003). However, these labels tend to 
demand that their distributors provide increased marketing and promotional 
services, which many of the Canadian indie firms cannot effectively provide as 
a result of limited staff and funds. Competing against the multinational firms for 
the rights to distribute foreign-owned indie catalogues has proven to be futile 
for most Canadian indies, as the majors have reputations for international 
success, as well as remarkable sales and promotion services and access to a 
vast amount of capital to provide necessary advances. As access to foreign 
product is core to Canada's independent distribution sector, competition from 
the multinationals has become a growing concern. According to Geoff 
Kulawick, President and CEO of Linus Entertainment based in Mississauga, 
Ontario: 
Canadian distributors and labels will remain as niche players 
without any significant international catalogs so long as the majors 
have free rein to pick up foreign catalogs. I'd like to carry more 
international lines but I can't afford a bidding war. As soon as an 
international label becomes meaningful, the multinationals go after it. 
The only hope for independent labels and distributors to compete is 
that a restriction be placed on the multinationals distributing un-
owned products, like there is for the Canadian film business. 
(Cited in LeBlanc 2003) 
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As a result of controlling a range of various kinds of media, such as film, 
television, music recordings, and print publications, the multinationals can 
cross-market products, and therefore they have an immense impact on the 
global music market. While it is in the best interests of Canadian-based 
companies to launch their artists in foreign countries because of the 
substantial profits that can be earned in many major markets worldwide, 
Canadian indies rarely have the resources or market clout to do so effectively. 
As described above, the need to seek out artists has dropped on the 
majors' lists of pressing corporate goals, and thus the internationalization of 
the music industry in large part is a result of seeking out large markets in 
which to sell existing stock (Lovering 1998, 44). For Canadian indies seeking 
distribution outside of Canada there are significant obstacles, and the simplest 
way to achieve international distribution would be to distribute with a 
Canadian-based multinational, which can be a problem for small firms 
specializing in niche markets. 
While the popularity of the internet and MP3 technology offers new 
possibilities for the distribution of music, insofar as these innovations allow 
consumers to both download specific tunes and entire albums (often for free) 
and to have access to multiple points of purchase throughout the world on a 
24 hour basis, there are growing concerns amongst the indies that this may 
lead to a further strengthening of the majors' hold on distribution. Downloads, 
subscription services, digital radio, interactive music sites and, increasingly, 
popular internet music news sites (such as pitchformedia.com, delusions of 
56 
adequacy and allmusic.com) are creating new ways for (niche) music to be 
widely disseminated. At the same time, however, multinationals such as 
AOLffime-Warner can use their established reputations and marketing muscle 
to attract a high volume of paying customers to their online services. 
As digital distribution matures, and the multinationals offer specials such 
as packages of music at discount rates in conjunction with other convenient 
content and services (made possible through channels established through 
the process of vertical integration such as economic advantages in packaging 
costs over retailers), many fear that existing channels of distribution will 
become even more concentrated, leaving indies and traditional music retailers 
with increased competition from online services (LeBlanc 2003). In the August 
18th , 2001 issue of Billboard magazine, the former Jupiter Media Matrix senior 
analyst Aram Sinnreich discussed this problem: "Pressplay - and to a lesser 
extent Musicnet - are about creating artificially constructed avenues for the 
distribution of music that preserves the major labels' cartel on an interactive 
platform" (cited in LeBlanc 2003). Meanwhile, others remain positive despite 
the challenges faced, such as the President of Distribution Fusion III/Justin 
Time Records, Jim West, who stated that, "I will still have an alternative. 
There's always going to be someone set up with a system that we will be able 
to put independent music through. There will always be someone" (LeBlanc 
2003). 
There are still some Canadian artists who prefer to handle distribution 
themselves. While they face limited access to mainstream retail, they rely 
57 
primarily on touring to promote and sell their recordings. There was a time 
when major retailers such as HMV would agree to sell their recordings on a 
consignment basis, but in June 2002 HMV stopped accepting consigned 
products. This was a major blow to the Canadian indie community as selling 
their consigned albums in HMV helped to spark Canada's indie boom in the 
early '90s, according to Larry LeBlanc (2003). However, according to 
Jonathan Rees, VP of product for HMV Canada, HMV stopped accepting 
consigned products because of "the amount of time it was taking stores and 
head-office to deal with small amounts of product. We had 3,500 to 4,000 
individual consignment accounts in effect." In other words, as major 
distributors such as HMV began to feel the pressure of falling CD sales, they 
could no longer take the risk of accepting CDs on a consignment basis from 
independent artists or indie record labels - the sales space devoted to these 
indie recordings, and the administrative overhead involved in monitoring sales 
and making sure the right people got paid, exceeded any share of the sales 
revenues, and/or could be better employed displaying another rack of albums 
and DVDs by proven artists such as Avril Lavigne, 50 Cent, Michael Buble or 
the Arctic Monkeys. 
As demonstrated in the preceding chapter, changing consumption and 
retailing practices have a huge effect on choices made by distributors. As 
music sales have declined over the past 6 years or so, music retailers have 
increasingly devoted more merchandise space to other entertainment products, 
most notably DVD's. As a result, with so many products being released each 
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month, distributors establish priorities with respect to the resources put behind 
each release and create marketing campaigns to go along with those deemed 
most likely to succeed. Indie distributors, however, do not have the funds or 
staff to cope with the rising demands put on distributors by the retailers, or the 
soaring costs of shipping, processing, warehousing. marketing, in-store 
positioning and retail campaigns. Due to diminishing CD sales, retailers are 
controlling their inventory much more tightly and tend to limit their purchases 
to a smaller supply for a briefer period of time, leading to more frequent 
ordering and delivering, which is costly for labels and distributors. Since there 
are so few major record chain stores in Canada, these retailers have 
substantial bargaining power with labels and distributors. Indeed, as in the 
United States, a growing share of record sales is attributable to "Big Box" 
stores, such as Walmart, which are able - by virtue of their growing market 
share - to exercise considerable influence over the style and content of music 
released by record labels, large or small, and consumed by their customers 
(see, for example, Fox 2005). 
Restricted supply orders from distributors lead to labels and distributors 
having to become more aggressive in persuading retailers to make volume 
purchases of albums, often using rebate programs and huge retail campaigns, 
once again leaving indie labels and independent distributors out of the 'big 
game'. Sales staff and floor walkers are encouraged to participate in 
promotional campaigns for major label releases. Retailers are encouraged to 
take chances on albums by major labels and distributors by allowing them to 
59 
return unsold products, a strategy which often proves to be crippling for the 
indies; supplying indie products to major retailers is not only an uphill battle for 
positioning and marketing campaigns, it is also a huge risk-taking endeavor, 
one that many indies no longer bother taking (LeBlanc 2003). Regarding the 
large chain record stores, Ian Lavsky of Constellation Records stated: 
What those places tend to do is ask for the absolute lowest 
wholesale price, put the absolute largest markup on it, maybe give it 
a really nice price for the first 2 weeks, because they're all about 
shifting as many as they can in the first week or month, then getting 
it into the back catalogue. They basically want the label, or the 
distributor and the label, to advertise it here, here, here and here, 
they specify the size the ad should be, make sure their logo's on 
it. .. you're essentially paying them to be your main point of sale, in 
that kind of, you know, 'let's hit hard' ... So this obviously affects the 
music industry like no other. 
Digital technologies in production and distribution have become a major 
focus in the media and academic writing over the past few years; they have 
been praised as a practical and significant means for artists and small labels 
to reach audiences without depending on the established series of 
intermediaries described above. Nevertheless, there are skeptics who do not 
believe that the new technologies have had the revolutionary effect envisioned 
by indie music supporters and feared by the multinationals. As Roger Wallis 
has observed, the early assumptions concerning e-commerce, such as its 
ability to "guarantee a greater range of choice for consumers and higher 
financial returns for suppliers/producers," turned out to be "oversimplifications" 
(Wallis 2006,287). Instead, Wallis continues, "current data suggests that the 
power structure in the music industry serves to maintain a status quo under 
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which different players in the valuable chain can retain their power and 
revenue structure ... [and] the age old tensions between concentration and 
diversification have not been markedly altered by the introduction of digital 
networks" (287). He concludes by stating that the role of regulators will be vital 
in restricting those who strive to achieve global control of the music market 
(309). 
While the effects of digital downloads on the industry and the reasons 
behind the slump in CO sales are still being debated, the fact is that most of 
the large chains have greatly diversified, leaving room in the market for indie 
retailers. Meyer Billurcu, of Blue Skies Turn Black promotions in Montreal, 
described his observations of changes in the music business: 
Well I work for Sonic Unyon distribution also, and it's really weird 
right now. Retail, at the majors' level, is really bad. I think what's 
happening is a lot of the major label acts, they're like, singles bands, 
so people are just downloading singles and they're not buying CO's, 
whereas a lot of indie bands are finding that they're getting more 
success because people are discovering them through downloading. 
You don't need radio, you don't need MuchMusic, you basically 
need a Myspace page now and you can pretty much get your music 
out there. 
The big chains are struggling. When you go into chain stores 
now it's mostly video games and OVO's and some of them have 
books. CD's and music have become a much smaller percentage of 
what they're actually selling but the indie stores seem to be thriving. 
I was at Atom Heart [an indie record store in Montreal] the other day 
and they were saying that so far they've had their best few months 
since they've opened. I think indie bands are doing better but their 
expectations are lower than what a major label act would have but 
it's definitely changed. You see Billboard now, and the top selling 
records of the week is at 100,000 copies - it used to be 500,000. 
In Canada, the changes transforming the global music industry are also 
affecting domestic artists, record companies, distributors and audiences, and 
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Canadian policy-makers are struggling to keep up. As in many European 
countries, the problems being tackled by Canadian policy-makers include 
finding ways to compete for international sales without losing cultural identity 
and combining cultural and industrial interests (Frith 1993, 21). 
The former of these two problems, the threatened loss of cultural identity, 
is not a major concern in and of itself at the moment, for several reasons. 
Firstly, the discussion of issues pertaining to a national cultural identity in 
Canada is a contentious one; there is most certainly a lack of accord in being 
able to define the ever so elusive 'Canadian identity'. A thorough analysis of 
literature on this subject is beyond the scope of this thesis, and considering 
the multicultural diversity present within this country, constructing an argument 
solely on the basis of cultural protectionism in Canada is an ineffectual if not 
futile task. As John Sinclair has noted: "It is ever more difficult to find 
intellectual justification, as distinct from visceral sentiment or intuition, to 
support the belief that a nation's audiovisual products can somehow be an 
authentic expression of the culture of that nation, and so affirm that culture 
among its recipients. It is clearly the notion of national culture that is the 
weakest link in the argument" (Sinclair 1996, 39). At the same time, cultural 
arguments for protecting and promoting Canadian music are useful in 
rhetorical or ideological terms - to help legitimize policies that are often 
undertaken for economic or industrial reasons: this has become more 
important under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which 
gives cultural industries exceptional status in permitting some forms of 
protectionism and governmental support. 
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Generally, however, it is more useful to frame cultural and industrial issues 
within the paradigm of the 'local' and the 'global', insofar as we can speak of 
local Canadian scenes (such as the Montreal scene, or rather scene§., 
discussed in chapter 1) and the international global industry. As Simon Frith 
has claimed, the 'national' no longer matters in cultural politics, the local and 
the global are what is important now (Frith 1993,23). Martin Cloonan, on the 
other hand, argues that, even in the era of globalization, the nation-state is still 
an important site of cultural production and consumption, regulation and 
identity: hence, "many Nation-States retain the power to intervene in the global 
market and to help local musicians reach a wider audience than they 
otherwise would" (Cloonan 1999,204). As Cloonan suggests, in order to 
satisfy both cultural and industrial interests, the real problem facing policy-
makers is to assist musicians in "finding audiences for their work rather than 
vice versa" (Shuker 2001,68). This is where public policy becomes a major 
factor as "it is cultural distribution, not cultural production, that is the key locus 
of power and profit" (Sinclair 1996, 37). 
The sentiment that the independent music sector is profoundly dependent 
on systems of government, and other public, support is echoed through much 
of the literature on the subject of the structure of the music industry (LeBlanc 
2003; Golding & Murdock 1991, 81; Shuker 2001,71). These 'protectionist' 
policies were generally adopted for both cultural and economic purposes. 
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Accordingly, they typically included financial programs, such as grants and 
subsidies, as well as regulatory policies such as quotas. The Canadian Radio 
and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) was established by the 
Canadian parliament in 1968 in order to create policies and grant licenses for 
all broadcast media and telecommunications carriers (such as Bell Canada). 
The 1968 Broadcasting Act required the CRTC to ensure that each 
"broadcasting undertaking ... shall make maximum use, and in no case less 
than predominant use, of Canadian creative and other resources in the 
creation and presentation of programming." 
The CRTC established Canadian content quotas (popularly referred to as 
CanCon) for AM radio in 1971 and extended them to FM radio in 1976, 
whereby a minimum percentage (initially 30% for AM) of music selections 
played during the broadcast day must qualify as 'Canadian content.' In order 
to determine whether a particular musical track could be labeled 'Canadian', it 
was decided that at least two of four criteria must be met: 
1. the music must be wholly composed by a Canadian; 
2. the artist (or principal performer) must be Canadian; 
3. the production must have been wholly recorded in Canada or be a 
recording of a live performance carried on Canadian radio or TV; 
4. the lyrics must be wholly written by a Canadian. 
The initials of these four criteria create the acronym MAPL, often found on 
the back of CDs to indicate whether an album qualifies as Canadian content. 
In the early 1980's several programs were created to provide subsidies to 
the sound recording industry, partially in response to claims made by private 
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broadcasters that there were not enough high-quality Canadian recordings to 
meet the requirements established by the CTRC (Wright 1991, 307-8). In 1982, 
a number of Canadian-owned private broadcasters (CHUM Limited, Moffat 
Communications and Rogers Broadcasting Limited) joined with the Canadian 
Independent Record Producers Association (CIRPA) and the Canadian Music 
Publishers Association (CMPA) to establish the Foundation to Assist Canadian 
Talent on Record, or FACTOR. The Foundation's first annual budget was only 
$200,000, but in 1986 the federal government created the Sound Recording 
Development Program (SRDP), with a plan to "pump $2.5 million into the 
Canadian recording industry over five years" (Wright 1991, 308). Much of this 
money went to FACTOR and its Quebec equivalent, MusicAction, created in 
1985. In effect, the federal government had entered into a public-private 
partnership with the broadcasting and recording industries to promote 
Canadian music. Numerous other programs were created over the next 15 
years to assist artists in recording and promoting their music. In 2002, these 
various programs were merged together in the Canadian Music Fund (CMF). 
Before going on to take a closer look at the specifics of subsidies provided by 
the Federal government, it is important to consider the criticisms that both the 
regulatory policies (CanCon) and subsidy programs have received over the 
years from journalists, industry players, musicians, and academics. 
Although the success of CanCon has been widely acknowledged (see, for 
example, Shuker 2001,76), it received its share of opposition, notably from 
the Canadian Association of Broadcasters (CAB), a group representing the 
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interests of private broadcasters, and the Canadian Recording Industry 
Association (CRIA), a group representing the Canadian subsidiaries of the 
'majors.' One of the first issues to be raised by CAB in response to the 
introduction of Canadian content regulations was the relative scarcity of 
Canadian recordings; indeed, both the quantity and quality of 'Canadian' 
recordings were considered to be major obstacles for private broadcasters if 
they were to comply with CanCon requirements. For example, a CAB survey 
of FM radio programmers in 1990 found that few broadcasters believed there 
to be "enough Canadian music to sustain a higher quota" (Wright 1991, 309). 
The argument made by many private broadcasters was that, in order to 
comply with the CRTC' s regulations, broadcasters were forced to play 
substandard Canadian content recordings, and consequently, Canadian 
recordings and artists in general were quickly dismissed as "third-rate stuff", 
especially by American broadcasters and record executives (Wright 1991, 
312). However accurate these sentiments may have been in the early days of 
CanCon, this argument isn't particularly relevant now, considering the wide 
access to high quality recording technology that exists today; broadcast quality 
recordings can be made in people's homes, and often are. Nevertheless, in a 
submission to the CRTC in 2006, the CAB proposed a reduction in the 
required percentage of Canadian content recordings, stating that conventional 
radio was faCing increased competition from alternative music sources such as 
Internet radio, satellite radio and iPods, creating an environment where 
consumers control choice (CAB communique 2006). 
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There is most certainly a large amount of dissatisfaction expressed by 
Canadians, certainly in Montreal, about the quality and lack of choice in radio 
stations that are available, exemplified in the Montreal weekly English paper 
The Mirror. Every week The Mirror runs a column called the "Rant Line", 
where Montrealers call in their opinions on various topics; local radio has been 
a frequent topiC of discussion, with "Montreal radio sucks" being the best 
summary of the sentiments expressed (Montreal Mirror). The fact that such 
strong feelings, good or bad, can still be aired about radio in public debate 
demonstrates that radio is not a dead medium (yet) and, therefore, that 
Canadian content regulations may still have a role to play. 
On the other side of the debate from the CAB, CIRPA, representing 
independent record producers, has lobbied for an increase in Can Con 
requirements for FM radio and for more intensive monitoring of broadcasts to 
ensure that the Canadian content quotas are not being filled during non-peak 
periods (i.e. very late nighUearly morning when there are fewer listeners). A 
growing number of musicians and critics have been arguing that radio stations 
tend to fulfill their CanCon quotas with "safe" choices, meaning well-
established artists, and excluding newer, emerging artists. This problem 
further compounds the very situation that the Canadian content rules were 
originally designed to remedy: the fact that new Canadian artists had difficulty 
establishing a fan base within Canada. As a result, the problem persists and 
often Canadian artists are forced to build an audience outside of Canada 
before Canadian radio stations will play them. Arcade Fire, for example, 
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received almost no commercial radio airplay in Canada until months after the 
band had already been widely recognized as rising stars in the American 
music media, and Daniel Powter had to reach the pop charts in Europe before 
Canadian radio played his music. While the CRTC has acknowledged this 
issue and was considering establishing a quota for emerging artists and 
awarding 'bonus' Canadian selection points for broadcasting new artists' 
recordings, in its 2006 commercial radio policy review, it stated that "a quota 
system would be difficult to apply fairly to stations operating in different 
formats, and that an incentive system could entail a reduction in the overall 
level of Canadian music broadcast" (CRTC 2006). 
There have also been several widely publicized controversies regarding 
the MAPL system, with the case of Bryan Adams' 1991 album Waking Up the 
Neighbors failing to qualify as Canadian content as a result of his 
collaborations with non-Canadians probably being the most well-known. 
Because Adams' album was recorded in Los Angeles and because most of 
the songs on it, including the biggest hit "(Everything I Do) I Do It For You" 
(from the soundtrack of Robin Hood: Prince of Thieves), were co-written by 
Adams and Robert "Mutt" Lange (a British citizen now perhaps better known 
as "Mr Shania Twain"), only one of the four "MAPL" criteria were met 
(nationality of the principal artist) and therefore they did not qualify as 
"Canadian content" for the purposes of radio play. Both Adams and his 
manager Bruce Allen uttered strong condemnation of the CanCan system (se!3 
the views of Adams and other Canadian musicians cited in Potter 1999, 125-
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132}. In response to this controversy, the CRTC amended the Canadian 
content criteria to allow songs to qualify if both words and music had been co-
written by a Canadian, a move which some saw as a dilution of the 
requirements while others saw it as belated recognition of the fact that song-
writing is often a collaborative process. 
Although there is little doubt that the CanCon regulations are not perfect, 
the regulations are reviewed regularly and problems are addressed. In 1998, 
for example, in response to concerns that the required proportion of Canadian 
music had failed to keep up with the growing success of Canadian artists in 
both domestic and international markets, the CanCon quota for most radio 
formats was raised from 30% to 35% of music selections and stricter controls 
were placed on when, during the broadcast day, these selections should be 
played. It should be noted that these changes were announced at the same 
time that the CRTC relaxed controls on the number of stations broadcast 
companies could own in the same markets - one of a series of balancing acts 
that the CRTC has performed to keep its principal stakeholders satisfied. 
However, neither the specific details of the Canadian content criteria nor the 
exact percentage of Can Con music required is the major concern to be 
discussed here; these problems can be fixed, or at the very least considered 
and reviewed, and amendments to the policies can be made as needed. 
Rather, since there are many critics that believe that the CanCon quotas 
should be eliminated altogether, it is perhaps more useful to examine these 
arguments at this point. 
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As discussed in Robert Wright's article 'Gimme Shelter': Observations on 
Cultural Protectionism and the Recording Industry in Canada '(1991), the 
general value of CanCon quotas and its use for 'Canadian culture' has been 
questioned by critics for several reasons. Firstly, some critics contend that the 
federal government's public policies regarding the sound recording sector 
undermine its own principal objective of developing a strong domestic 
recording industry. Since the Canadian market is too small in most cases to 
allow for recovery of the costs of production, the survival of Canadian indies 
depends on their ability to extend their sales beyond Canada and achieve 
success in international markets. Thus, it has been argued that "the most 
successful Canadian musicians and record companies are those which fit 
most readily into the larger world of Anglo-American popular music" (Wright 
1991,312). FACTOR's distribution offunds has been molded accordingly, 
providing larger grants to fewer artists so that those who are supported receive 
funding sufficient for expansion to foreign markets. Moreover, successful 
Canadian indies have traditionally been those that distribute foreign product in 
Canada as well as producing their own Canadian recordings; but this has 
become increasingly difficult as a result of the industry's distribution oligopoly 
discussed in the previous chapter. As Wright (1991) states, "CanCon 
legislation has failed to serve as a launching pad from which Canadian 
performers might attain international stardom" (314). So, if success comes 
from cracking international markets with allegedly homogenized, "generic" rock 
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music, why should Canadian broadcasters be forced to play Canadian 
content? 
This concern was addressed by Paul Audley in his book Canada's Cultural 
Industries: Broadcasting, Publishing, Records and Film (1983). There, he 
states: "Canadians who are involved in the creation and performance of music 
ought to have a fair chance to have their music recorded and played on radio 
stations in Canada" (139). While it was once commonplace for Canadian 
musicians to have to go south to the United States to pursue their careers, 
especially if they had ambitions of international stardom, by the 1990s many 
Canadian artists wanted to stay in Canada and use it as a base for their 
musical careers. This trend was observed by Jodi Berland: 
Canadian composers and musicians' associations and magazines 
show that Canadian agents, producers, musicians and owners of 
independent labels have been angry and disturbed at the difficulty 
of working within their own national market. This doesn't mean they 
don't share the aspiration of making it in the US, but rather that they 
want to retain their own country - still a different country with 
different experiences, tastes and sounds, not to mention institutions 
and ideologies - as somewhere to start and somewhere to come 
back to, and for some, as somewhere to stay (Berland 1991, 324). 
Perhaps instead of questioning whether it is fair for broadcasters in Canada to 
"be forced" to playa requisite amount of Canadian content, a more appropriate 
question would be to consider whether it is fair for Canadian artists to be 
essentially shut out of their home market. In the end, eliminating CanCon 
quotas is tantamount to the federal government conceding to the demands of 
multinational conglomerates and private investors ... again. 
71 
This leads to a second concern raised by critics: are Can Con quotas truly 
a cultural protectionist measure insofar as Canadian recording can be said to 
teach us about each other and our unique cultural experiences? William 
Watson (1988) has argued that at most, government policies should subsidize 
projects that teach Canadians about one another, and that Can Con eligibility 
criteria should be based on the 'Canadian-ness' of the content rather than its 
production, although Watson is generally in favor of eliminating the CanCon 
legislation altogether. As mentioned earlier, however, there is a lack of 
consensus (at the very least) on what constitutes 'Canadian-ness', and 
therefore basing subsidy distribution or radio play on such a concept would 
undoubtedly be rife with controversy (with different actors seeking to impose 
their own definitions of "Canadian," which would be highly dependent on 
issues of taste and value) and extremely difficult to put into practice. Indeed, if 
followed to its natural conclusion, this approach would lead to something 
resembling the arguments made by the Frankfurt school and debates 
regarding the high culture/low culture divide, which are beyond the scope of 
this thesis, since, as mentioned in chapter 1, I am concerned here with political 
economy, and not the moral, aesthetic or cultural worth of the artistic projects 
in question. Again, to quote Jody Berland (1991, 324), "Whether Canadian 
culture can be identified or defended as a unitary 'national subject' ... is of little 
theoretical interest to a community of musicians and cultural producers who 
recognize a working oppression which affects them and which they discuss, in 
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contexts related to music industry issues, in terms of their Canadian 
nationality" . 
Beyond this, however, Watson raises a third concern, as to whether it is 
appropriate to channel such a large amount of our tax dollars into recordings 
that may never reach the ears of the Canadians that 'paid' for them. This 
concern is justifiable, yet as it pertains specifically to subsidies, let us first 
examine how funds are distributed: how much, and to whom? 
In June, 2001 the Federal government announced an initiative called 
"Tomorrow Starts Today" (TST), created to subsidize Canadian arts and 
culture. Within its budget, funds are distributed to the CBC, the Canada 
Council for the Arts, multicultural programs, and new investments in the book 
industry and the music industry. Under this initiative, the Canadian Sound 
Recording policy was born (also known as From Creators to Audiences), and 
the Canada Music Fund was established to "introduce a new and integrated 
range of both innovative and proven programs designed to deliver on the 
policy's vision of supporting diversity, capacity, and excellence in the sound 
recording industry, at every level, from creators to audience" (Canadian 
Heritage, no date). This umbrella fund, which absorbed the SRDP and other 
pre~existing subsidies and grant programs), consists of a series of eight 
programs created to three main policy objectives. The principal objectives of 
the Canadian Music Fund are: 
• To enhance Canadians' access to a diverse range of Canadian music 
choices through existing and emerging media; 
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• To increase the opportunities available for Canadian music artists and 
cultural entrepreneurs to make a significant and lasting contribution to 
Canadian cultural expression; and 
• To ensure that Canadian music artists and entrepreneurs have the skills, 
know-how and tools to succeed in a global and digital environment. 
(Canadian Heritage, no date) 
In 2004-2005, approximately $25 million of the Tomorrow Starts Today 
budget was allotted to the Canadian Music Fund. A closer look at the 
individual annual budgets of the programs under the CMF as well as how the 
subsidies are distributed can provide better insight as to how, specifically, the 
fund is assisting Canadian artists and the sound recording industry. The 
Canada Music Fund consists of the following seven grant-based programs (an 
eighth program, the Policy Monitoring Program, exists to track and help co-
ordinate the work of the other seven)5: 
• Creators' Assistance Program 
• Canadian Musical Diversity Program 
• New Musical Works Program 
• Music Entrepreneur Program 
• Support to Sector Associations Program 
• Collective Initiatives Program 
• Canadian Music Memories Program 
5 The following information on the CMF programs was gathered from the Canadian Heritage website. 
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The Creators' Assistance Program, administered by the SaCAN Foundation, 
distributed $825,500 in 2004-2005 to composers, lyricists, and songwriters, 
with a maximum amount of $300,000 per year in assistance to a single project, 
and eligible recipients are Canadian not-for-profit music sector organizations 
and associations representing Canadian creators. The Canadian Heritage 
contribution represented 100% of the SaCAN Foundation's total funding 
commitment of $825,500 for the program in 2004-05. Administrative expenses 
of $66,987 accounted for 8% of funds used. Under the Creators' Assistance 
Program, the SaCAN Foundation received five funding applications from five 
Canadian associations requesting a total of $1,165,600. All the applications 
were approved, entailing an investment of $813,814 or 70% of the total 
amount requested. In 2004-05, these Canadian not-for-profit associations 
sponsored a number of workshops, seminars and showcases across Canada. 
In all, these projects attracted more than 3,400 Canadians (Canadian Heritage, 
2006). 
The Canadian Musical Diversity Program, administered by the Canada 
Council for the Arts (CCA), assists Canadian creators, artists and 
entrepreneurs involved in the production, distribution and promotion of 
specialized sound recordings and is aimed at promoting musical diversity (as 
its title suggests) within the Canadian recording industry. The CCA used all of 
the $1,406,250 allocated by the CMF in 2004-05. af the $1,406,250 available, 
$1,286,250 was applied toward grants, the remainder, accounting for 9% of all 
funds, were used for administrative costs. 427 applications were evaluated by 
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the CCA under the Canadian Musical Diversity Program, and a total of 
$5,765,783 was requested; however only 22% of that amount ($975,120) was 
approved for 96 projects. The program supports recordings produced in a 
variety of genres including folk, world music, Aboriginal music, jazz, musique 
actuelle, new music, classical and electroacoustic music (Canadian Heritage, 
2006). 
The New Musical Works Program is administered by FACTOR for the English-
language recording industry and by its Quebec counterpart, MusicAction, for 
the French sector. This program was created to assist Canadian creators, 
artists, record labels and other music recording entrepreneurs in the 
production and promotion of their recordings, and to develop their craft and 
expertise. In 2004-05, both FACTOR and MusicAction used all of the funds 
available under the CMF, $7,068,184 and $4,685,900 respectively. 
Administrative expenses for FACTOR of $1 ,439,807 accounted for 10% of all 
public- and private-sector funding received ($14,386,647) and for MusicAction 
administrative expenses of $665,266 accounted for 8% of all public- and 
private-sector funding received ($8,331,324), (with additional funds coming 
from broadcasters, loan repayments and investment income for both FACTOR 
and MusicAction.) In 2004-05 FACTOR received 3,057 requests totaling 
$33,186,364 for a range of projects; of these, it approved 1,197, for a total 
commitment of $10,895,668, or 33% of the total requested. FACTOR 
disbursed a total of $8,756,277 on past and current commitments. MusicAction 
used all of the $4,685,900 available under the CMF. MusicAction approved 
673 of the 806 applications it received, for a total funding commitment of 
$7,681,958, or 64% of the $11,976,091 requested. 
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The Collective Initiatives Program, administered by FACTOR and MusicAction, 
seeks to promote the development of the Canadian sound recording industry 
by increasing the presence of Canadian activities (such as conferences, award 
shows, showcases), companies, record labels, creators and artists. regionally, 
nationally and internationally. Eligible recipients are Canadian not-for-profit 
organizations, associations and/or corporations. In 2004-05, the CMF invested 
$2,588,453 in this program, ($1,563,338 to FACTOR and $1,025,115 to 
MusicAction). Both FACTOR and MusicAction used all of the funds received 
under CMF, with administrative expenses of $1 ,439,807 accounting for 10% of 
all public- and private-sector funding received ($14,386,647) by FACTOR and 
$665,266 accounting for 8% of all pubJic- and private-sector funding received 
($8,331,324) by MusicAction (again, with additional funds coming from 
broadcasters, loan repayments and investment income). 
The Music Entrepreneur Program (MEP), a program created to complement 
the New Musical Works Program, focuses on a core group of established 
Canadian businesses actively involved in developing and promoting Canadian 
creators and performers. The program is administered by Telefilm Canada and 
the ultimate goal of the program is to ensure that Canadian music 
entrepreneurs build a strong, sustainable industry. The MEP has four 
objectives: 
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• to offer Canadians a range of compelling Canadian choices that 
properly reflect the country's regional and cultural diversity, as well as 
its two official languages, in the digital economy; 
• to facilitate the long-term development of artistic talent; 
• to establish a dynamic Canadian presence online; 
• to promote innovative use of new technologies. 
The eligible recipients are Canadian-owned and -controlled firms with a proven 
track record in developing and marketing Canadian musical talent, and whose 
principal business is the production and marketing of Canadian-content sound 
recordings. Telefilm Canada used all of the $5,341,014 allocated by the CMF 
in 2004-05, with administrative expenses of $534,103 accounting for 10% of 
all funds received. Since the program was established in 2002-03, contracts 
have been signed with 20 applicants, for funding commitments totaling $18.4M 
over a three-year period. 
The Support to Sector Associations Program, administered by the Department 
of Canadian Heritage, is designed to enable Canada's sound recording sector 
associations to provide their members with professional representation 
services, as well as analysis of public initiatives and industry trends and issues. 
Basically, this program is meant to provide support to associations (such as 
CIRPA) to strengthen infrastructure and eligible recipients are Canadian not-
for-profit sound recording sector associations. As a result of this assistance to 
associations, Canadians in areas such as songwriting, music publishing, 
sound recording, marketing and performance will be able to make more 
informed decisions about their careers and activities within the industry. 
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The Canadian Music Memories Program, jointly administered by Library and 
Archives Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage through the 
Audio-Visual Preservation Trust of Canada, ensures that Canadian sound 
recording works are preserved in order to provide Canadians with access to 
their musical heritage. Eligible recipients are recognized organizations that 
specialize in providing access to Canadian sound recordings, as well as in 
their preservation and conservation. In 2004-05, Library and Archives Canada 
used all of the $360,000 it received under the CMF, distributed in three major 
spheres of activity: $124,500 for acquisitions, $193,900 for access and 
awareness, and $41,600 for conservation. The Department of Canadian 
Heritage allotted $186,455 of the $200,000 available from the CMF to the 
Audio-Visual Preservation Trust of Canada. The funds were distributed in two 
major spheres of activity: $90,000 for education and $67,500 for public 
engagement. 
Finally, as noted above, in addition to the seven grant-based components of 
the CMF, there is an eighth element under the Tomorrow Starts Today 
initiative, the Policy Monitoring Program, which enables the Sound Recording 
Policy and Programs Directorate to track and evaluate changes affecting the 
domestic and international sound recording industries, and to monitor and 
measure the progress and impact of CMF programs. The program is managed 
by the Sound Recording Policy and Programs Directorate of the Department of 
Canadian Heritage. The Policy Monitoring Program used $743,607 of the 
$1,000,000 available in 2004-05, mainly to establish databases, gather 
statistics and conduct studies. 
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In 2004-05, then, a total of $24,676,920 was distributed amongst the eight 
programs under the TST initiative. So, the critiques concerning the spending of 
Canadian tax dollars on funding the sound recording industry appear to be a 
legitimate concern of Canadian taxpayers. However, in 2004, record sales in 
Canada totaled $562.2 million, according to CRIA, generating $33.7 million in 
federal taxes (and more for provincial treasuries). In 2000, foreign-controlled 
companies sold $74 million worth of recordings by Canadian artists-
accounting for 54% of all sales by Canadian artists, and Canadian-controlled 
companies sold $64 million in recordings by Canadian artists in 2000 - a 
reduction of 19 per cent from 1998 (Canada Council for the Arts, no date), so 
subsidies are one way of channeling capital gained from foreign-controlled 
companies back into the Canadian industry. In light of these figures, the 
programs are hardly the drain on the public coffers suggested by critics 
denouncing the use of tax dollars for grants to the recording industry and 
Canadian artists. 
Lastly, as a fourth major concern about public policies in the music 
industry, critics have posed the question of whether Canadians should be 
"forced" to listen to Canadian music. The Canadian Association of 
Broadcasters has insisted that radio audience shares decrease in direct 
proportion to the amount of Canadian content broadcast (Wright 1991, 311). 
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Moreover, while most radio stations are now required to devote at least 35 % 
of their music selections to Canadian content, according to CIRPA, sales of 
domestic repertoire stand at 25% of all record sales, including Canadian artists 
signed to multi-national companies (CIRPA, no date). So, if Canadians "vote 
with their radio tuners and record-buying dollars" (Wright 1991, 311), why do 
the results seem at odds with the federal governments repeated claims that 
"Canadians insist on being able to hear uniquely Canadian voices that 
resonate with their own distinct national experience"? (Stanbury, 1996) 
This issue cannot be rebutted so easily as it involves the question of taste 
and choices made by Canadians in general. However, Canadian public 
opinion seems to support the general principle of government support for the 
arts and cultural industries to maintain a semblance of Canadian cultural 
sovereignty. According to Jody Berland (1991): 
Canadian discourses on culture and nation have not been 
uncontroversial .... But they are rooted in a surprisingly consensual, 
if unevenly effective, social democratic nationalism making broad 
political claims about the necessity of state intervention to preserve 
endangered cultural values and forms of expression. Underlying this 
consensus has been the belief in the central role of culture itself in 
strategies of colonialism, economic domination, or political 
autonomy. This claim is directly formulated in terms of the 
expressed need for an autonomous sphere of Canadian cultural 
production, that is, for a protected space in which an entity already 
self-defined as Other - defined negatively, without known qualities 
- could speak. 
In similar vein, one of my informants, Patricia Elliott, justified the rationale for 
government support of the music industry and other cultural industries. Elliott 
works for Trade Routes, a Department of Canadian Heritage program which 
assists arts and cultural industries to seek international markets. She 
explained some of the background to her work in the following terms: 
Well if you look at across the board the investment that the 
government puts into the cultural industries, it goes back into the 
50's, whether it's book publishing or film and television ... there's a 
recognition that if we didn't support our cultural industries in being 
able to provide Canadian content or tell Canadian stories it would 
be virtually impossible to compete against a market such as the US. 
There are other countries such as the UK or France, that have even 
recognized this and ratified treaties saying that culture should be 
protected. It's not just to be considered entertainment. But, if you 
want your artists to be able to tell the stories about your people you 
have to support them in some form or measure. If you look at the 
number of successful Canadian authors out there, and the success 
of the Canadian music industry, if those mechanisms hadn't been in 
place, would it have happened? I don't know. We support farmers, 
we support lumber, a number of different industries and part of it is 
our geographic placement. So, if people want to be able to read 
magazines like Chatelaine, or hear Canadian music, you have 
something in place to nurture that and support it or it's going to be 
virtually impossible - you're going to be listening to Britney Spears 
and reading Seventeen magazine. If you look at magazine shelf 
space, American magazines control 80 to 85% of the space, and 
when you walk into an HMV, and I think it's changing now because 
Canadian music is doing so well, but the majority of the time you 
walk in there and it's the top 10 of whoever's playing in the US 
market. 
Last, but not least, it is clear that successive Canadian governments have 
recognized the need to protect and/or promote domestic cultural industries 
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(and, perhaps, recognized the degree of public support for these industries) in 
their determination to maintain the exemption of culture from the effects of 
international trade agreements. When Canada signed the original Canada-US 
Free Trade Agreement in 1988, then-Prime Minister Brian Mulroney strongly 
emphasized cultural exemptions as part of his defence against opposition 
attacks that the Agreement threatened Canadian sovereignty. The same 
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exemptions were maintained in the new North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) when it came into force on January 1, 1994. Later in the 
1990s, the Liberal government of the day, in the person of Heritage Minister 
Sheila Copps, initiated international talks and cooperation with western 
European countries such as France and the Scandinavian nations to resist US 
attempts to challenge the special status of cultural industries within the World 
Trade Organization. 
At the same time, the federal government has often appeared to pursue 
contradictory policy objectives, supporting cultural industries through 
regUlation, subsidies and international trade policy, while counter-balancing 
these measures with policies of deregulation and privatization of the very 
industries it seeks to protect. This situation would seem like a large scale 
bureaucratic illustration of the idiom 'the left hand doesn't know what the right 
hand is doing'. For example, when the federal government levied high import 
taxes on master recordings to strengthen the industry, to avoid these tariffs all 
of the majors established subsidiary branches in Canada which now virtually 
monopolize the market (Wright 1991, 307). Another example, cited earlier, 
was the raising of Cancon quotas in 1998 at the same time that ownership 
rules were relaxed, leading to increased concentration of radio station 
ownership and reducing the numbers of small independent radio stations 
which have traditionally supported new Canadian artists. Whether or not this 
is simply a case of bureaucratic shortsightedness or the federal government 
trying to hide economic agendas with public/media-appeasing protectionist 
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measures is a question that I cannot solve here. However, it is evident that the 
contradictory nature of federal policies and measures have clearly had 
negative effects on the sound recording industry, despite CanCon regulations 
and millions of dollars in tax money being re-invested in the sound recording 
industry. 
Although my principal focus here is not on the cultural dimension of the 
Canadian music policy, I do not mean to dismiss the importance of cultural 
sovereignty or cultural reasons for supporting Canadian music. In fact, the 
opposite is true, but it is necessary to consider how political and economic 
measures factor into our cultural industries and culture in general. In the next 
chapter I consider a number of possible reforms that might be undertaken to 
improve Canadian public policy to strengthen the economic basis of the 
Canadian recording industry. 
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Chapter 4 
Where do we go from here? 
Government rhetoric tends to stress the cultural significance of the Canadian 
music industry. Nonetheless, the fact is that the Canadian music industry is 
economically significant. According to statistics compiled by the International 
Federation of Phonographic Industries (IFPI 2007), the retail value of the 
Canadian recorded music market in 2003 was $813 million (Cdn), compared 
with approximately $427 in retail sales for books and periodicals in the same 
year (Statistics Canada, no date). As a result, the sound recording industry is 
monitored by the federal government and adjustments to public policy and 
subsidies are (sometimes) made accordingly. 
In 2003, a report on the Canadian music industry, focusing mainly on 
distribution, was published by Canadian Heritage (LeBlanc, 2003). The Report 
was written by Larry LeBlanc, long-time Canadian correspondent for Billboard 
magazine and one of the leading experts on the Canadian music industry. 
LeBlanc made a series of policy recommendations to the federal government 
based on his research into the sound recording and distribution sectors in 
Canada (2003, 45); these recommendations are listed in Figure 4.1 below. In 
the following pages, I outline each of these recommendations in turn and 
assess its implications for the future of the independent music sector in 
Canada. 
Figure 4.1 
Recommendations of the LeBlanc Report 
1. That the improvement of Canadians' access to sound recordings with Canadian 
content is linked with labels and independently released artists having increased 
access to national distribution and retail channels in Canada. 
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2. That independent Canadian-owned labels be provided with resources to support their 
products in the marketplace, specifically funding be made available to market domestic 
recordings. Several suggest a 80:20 funding balance for launching new recordings. If 
20% of funding available is spent on recording of a project, 80% would be allotted to its 
marketing at retail. 
3. That there is a need for professional marketing and retail development programs to 
effectively heighten retail awareness of Canadian recordings. 
4. That there is a need for a broad range of skills upgrading within the Canadian label and 
distribution sectors, particularly in the development of marketing management and 
training in the use of new technologies. 
5. That an industry study be undertaken on the future of the electronic distribution of 
music and that it focus on the roles of the multinationals, independent distributors and 
labels. 
6. That Canadian-owned independent labels be provided with financial resources or that 
government policies be enacted that would allow them to compete effectively with 
majors in securing distribution rights to foreign labels in Canada. 
7. That there should be increased funding available to Canadian-owned labels and artists 
to secure and maintain distribution in foreign territories. 
8. As foreign-owned independent labels are increasingly pressing Canadian independent 
distributors to provide marketing, and promotional services to maximize their sales in 
Canada, Canadian independent distributors need further staff to offer defined 
promotion and marketing strategies, including supporting national touring of acts. 
Interviewees suggest that profits earned from foreign product sales would likely benefit 
the infrastructure of Canadian distribution. 
9. That there should be consultation with Canada's distribution sector in developing and 
operating the various government-run funding programs in place for Canadian music. 
Source: Music Distribution in Canada, Report prepared by Larry LeBlanc for Department of 
Canadian Heritage, April 2003, p. 45 
86 
Recommendation 1: That the improvement of Canadians' access to sound 
recordings with Canadian content is linked with labels and independently 
released artists having increased access to national distribution and retail 
channels in Canada. 
The importance of distribution is clearly emphasized throughout this 
thesis, yet it continues to be reshaped by changes within the industry. 
Over the last few years, developments in the music industry have led to 
major distributors such as Universal and EMI aggressively pursuing 
indie labels for distribution rights. The following is an excerpt from a 
Billboard Magazine article entitled "Hungry for Indies" (LeBlanc 2007): 
While Sony BMG Canada largely focuses on its own roster, insiders 
describe the competition among Universal, EMI and Warner for 
Canada's indies as fiercer than at any time in recent memory. 'The 
majors are hungry for indie labels,' says Dominique Zgarka, 
president of distributor Koch Entertainment (Canada). 'They're 
going after everything.' 'There's a lot of talent we want to participate 
in,' adds Tony Tarleton, EMI Music Canada director of associated 
labels. 'We're getting introduced to [indie] people I never thought 
we'd have conversations with.' 
In 1999, Allan Gregg formed Song Corp, a Toronto-based, fully-integrated 
music company which included a distribution division. The company was 
formed through acquisitions of three major Canadian music businesses: 
record label Attic Music Group (and its entire back catalogue), music publisher 
TMP and distributor Oasis Entertainment. However, Song Corp. went bankrupt 
in May 2001, 20 months after opening, owing $8.2-million to creditors (Straw 
2004). Although there has yet to be a successful nationwide Canadian-owned 
distributor, there are signs of promise in the industry. In January 2007, a 
partnership was announced between U.S. company Fontana Distribution and 
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Canadian indie MapleNationWide, offering Canadian independents increased 
access to the U.S. marketplace (LeBlanc 2006). Perhaps eventually, as 
changes in the industry (such as Sony-BMG and EMI closing their Canadian 
branches) create new openings in the market we will see Canadian 
entrepreneurs taking advantage of opportunities. 
Recommendation 2: That independent Canadian-owned labels be provided 
with resources to support their products in the marketplace, specifically 
funding be made available to market domestic recordings. Several suggest a 
80:20 funding balance for launching new recordings. If 20% of funding 
available is spent on recording of a project, 80% would be allotted to its 
marketing at retail. 
Recommendation 3: That there is a need for professional marketing and 
retail development programs to effectively heighten retail awareness of 
Canadian recordings. 
These two recommendations go together and share the problem that they are 
not quite as simple to implement since, as mentioned in previous chapters, 
there is a vast difference in the kind of marketing and promotion that a major 
label can provide to new artists compared to what a Canadian indie can 
provide, even with grant money. Nevertheless, indies are capable of using a 
wealth of strategies, such as guerilla marketing techniques, to spread the word 
of new releases by new artists, the likes of which are proving to be 
increasingly effective. Basic word of mouth is also a very important thing for 
new independent artists and should never be underestimated. When asked 
about the challenges faced by indie artists in terms of promotional funding, 
Patricia Elliott of Trade Routes noted: 
They don't have that kind of equity hanging around so that's why I 
think they have to look at alternative ways of getting their music out 
there and relying a lot on the Internet, relying a lot on fans. If you 
look at what Nettwerk does, they have these street teams in every 
big city, fans that they go to and they say x,y,z artist is coming in 
can you send out emails to all the people that you know and in 
return they get free tickets and merch and things like that. So they 
have these kind of street guerilla marketing teams out there, and I 
think the indies are looking at that more and more as a way of 
getting that distribution and looking ... less and less at a physical 
CD and trying to get space at Wal-Mart or HMV or Virgin, but selling 
through tours, selling online on downloading and looking at those 
because they can't compete. 
At the same time, Elliott pointed out, the majors are also changing their 
business practices in response to declining sales and competition from the 
internet. These changes are, in turn, providing new opportunities for indie 
labels: 
But then again you don't see the majors spending the money on 
individual artists like they did before, you know, you never hear 
about a multi CD deal signed for Beyonce or something like that, it 
just doesn't happen. There's a huge change in the landscape 
that's happening with the majors. I'm sure you're aware that Sony-
BMG and EMI have shut down their Canadian offices as of a 
couple of weeks ago, that's going to provide both an opportunity 
and a huge challenge for the indie people. On the one hand 
there's been this call to get rid of the majors, they don't know what 
they're doing, they're not reacting quickly enough to the changes 
in the industry but they've been there, with a huge infrastructure 
and when it disappears like it has with EMI and Sony-BMG, 
nothing has sprung up to replace it. So the indie labels have the 
advantage of being smaller and they can turn around quite quickly 
to take advantage of an opportunity, and they don't have the same 
kind of equity hanging in the balance as some of the majors do. 
In the face of slumping CD sales, the majors have partnered up with other 
industries to help promote and to create campaigns, often aimed at the box 
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store shoppers (i.e. Wal-Mart, Zellers). For example, Sony BMG participated 
in a marketing campaign with the Dairy Farmers of Canada for the "Moo You 
89 
Win" contest, whereby consumers could win a trip to see /I Divo play live in 
Scotland. Sony BMG also participated in a 'Kissables' campaign, giving away 
Hershey Kisses with various country music CD's in Zellers. The outcome of 
such campaigns are additional exposure for participating artists (II Divo was 
mentioned in television ads and was featured on in-store signs), better in-
store placement for products, and more in-store signage to capture shoppers' 
attention (D'innocenzo 2006). On the surface, this may not seem noteworthy; 
however, Wal-Mart and Best Buy are the first and second largest music 
retailers in the U.S. (Canadian figures are not available), with Wal-Mart 
holding 15.8% of the market share (itfacts.biz). So, while the majors are 
capable of using such gimmicky campaigns in the big-box stores, the indies 
are faced with the challenges of finding alternative ways to market and 
promote their artists. On this topic, Patricia Elliott stated: 
Personally I think that the independent record labels are going to do 
very well, and they already are. They're showing the ability to be a 
lot more nimble and take advantage of some of the music 
publishing, some of the alternative revenue streams that are coming 
through on mobile and alternate distribution. They can also take 
advantage of the fact that a release doesn't have to be in a physical 
form anymore. People aren't so much selling CD's anymore as 
they're downloading or putting it onto their iPod, cell phone or onto 
their PC. I think the indies have the advantage that they're a lot 
more aggressive in looking for guerilla street teams out there to help 
them and they turn around much quicker. There are challenges, on 
the other hand; because you have all these things like Myspace and 
YouTube and so, you have so much more music out there, and it's 
much easier for someone to produce a single and get it out there. 
So you're dealing with how to get people's attention. 
However, creating more room in the subsidy programs for marketing would no 
doubt be welcomed by artists, labels and distributors alike. 
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Recommendation 4: That there is a need for a broad range of skills 
upgrading within the Canadian label and distribution sectors, particularly in 
the development of marketing management and training in the use of new 
technologies. 
The federal government has acknowledged the need to improve marketing 
skills in the music industry, through programs such as Trade Routes, for which 
Patricia Elliott works, and through collaboration with privately run organizations 
such as CIRPA. Trade Routes is a Canadian Heritage program created to 
provide international business development services to support the small- and 
medium-sized enterprises in Canada's arts and cultural sector so that they 
become export-ready and can take full advantage of opportunities in the global 
marketplace. 
Recommendation 5:. That an industry study be undertaken on the future of 
the electronic distribution of music and that it focus on the roles of the 
multinationals, independent distributors and labels. 
Again, the federal government responded to this recommendation and in 2004 
a study was conducted for Canadian Heritage entitled "The Changing Face of 
Music Delivery: The Effects of Digital Technologies on the Music Industry." 
Other studies on new technologies and their effects on the music industry 
continue to proliferate. ConSidering the relative speed at which changes occur 
within the realm of digital technology and electronic distribution, the federal 
government should consider forming a special task force to be assigned to 
monitor this area to make adjustments to programs and to provide grant 
monies to innovative entrepreneurs in this realm. 
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Recommendation 6: That Canadian-owned independent labels be provided 
with financial resources or that government policies be enacted that would 
allow them to compete effectively with majors in securing distribution rights to 
foreign labels in Canada. . 
Without Canadian-owned nationwide distribution, this continues to pose a 
problem, so again, issues pertaining to distribution continue to rise to the 
forefront of industry problems. Since the majors have established worldwide 
channels of distribution, as well as considerable amount influence with 
promotional channels such as radio stations, television stations like 
MuchMusic and retail chains, it is difficult for indie labels and distributors to 
compete with the majors in this respect. 
Recommendation 7: That there should be increased funding available to 
Canadian-owned labels and artists to secure and maintain distribution in 
foreign territories. 
Recommendation 8: As foreign-owned independent labels are increasingly 
pressing Canadian independent distributors to provide marketing, and 
promotional services to maximize their sales in Canada, Canadian 
independent distributors need further staff to offer defined promotion and 
marketing strategies, including supporting national touring of acts. 
Interviewees suggest that profits earned from foreign product sales would 
likely benefit the infrastructure of Canadian distribution. 
Canadian Heritage programs, such as Trade Routes and international touring 
grants, address this issue. Again, arguments in preceding chapters in this 
thesis have demonstrated how important it is for Canadian artists to secure 
foreign distribution. Paradoxically, securing rights to distributing foreign music 
within Canada and distributing Canadian music outside of Canada both serve 
to strengthen the Canadian industry, in much the same way they did in the 
early days of the Canadian music industry, as described at the beginning of 
chapter 3. 
Recommendation 9: That there should be consultation with Canada's 
distribution sector in developing and operating the various government-run 
funding programs in place for Canadian music. 
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At time of writing (September 2007), there do not seem to be any major new 
government initiatives specifically oriented towards the development of the 
music distribution sector. As I hope to have demonstrated in this thesis, any 
such an initiative would be a huge benefit for the Canadian music industry, 
and this issue continues to be emphasized in other recent studies undertaken 
for the Department of Canadian Heritage (see, for example, Stein-Sacks, 
2006). 
Conclusion 
Whether such reports will lead to government-funded initiatives intended to 
build and support Canadian-run distribution channels remains to be seen. 
However, there is a remarkable history of changes in public policy being 
effected in response to studies and publications as well as public criticisms in 
the media, from Paul Audley's Canada's Cultural Industries : Broadcasting, 
Publishing, Records and Film (1983) to Larry LeBlanc's more recent Billboard 
articles and reports for Heritage Canada. This is vital, since, as Audley has 
stated, "any public policy that ignores the structural problems of the recording 
industry will almost certainly fail" (1983, 176). With millions of federal dollars 
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being channeled into the industry, government agencies such the Policy 
Monitoring Program of the Canadian Music Fund assess the health of the 
industry on a regular basis, ensuring that reports such as Larry LeBlanc's 
Music Distribution in Canada continue to keep us informed of current changes 
in the industry, particularly as they pertain to government policy. 
While many journalists and academics writing about the music industry in 
Canada seem to suggest that it faces a very grim outlook - indeed, in some 
cases that it and other cultural industries will inevitably succumb to the 
imperialistic tendencies of the American free market model - people who 
actually work in the industry seem more optimistic. While the music business 
faces many challenges, and is highly susceptible to changes in both global 
markets and domestic politics and policy, the indies seem pretty well-equipped 
to adjust and deal with them, in large measure because of the small scale of 
their business and low level of equity invested in any particular strategy. 
Perhaps the most important factor in guiding the indies is a passion for what 
they do, a key ingredient conceivably lacking in the majors, which are, 
correctly or incorrectly, now usually perceived to be run by "bean counters" 
(accountants) rather than "music people." Notwithstanding the challenges 
facing Canadian independent labels and artists, the market for independent 
artists in Canada seems to be a strong and resilient one, and will likely persist 
despite the economic and technological changes described in this thesis. 
If there is one major threat to the Canadian independent music industry 
today, it is the potential loss of the support provided by the federal government 
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in the form of subsidies and regulatory policies. Every new federal election and 
each re-examination of public budgets and expenditures brings about the 
possibility that funding will be cut or disappear altogether. It is important, 
therefore, for public policy makers, representatives of the Canadian music 
industry and, indeed, musicians themselves, emphasize the advantages for 
Canadian music and for the Canadian economy of maintaining these policies. 
In part, it is necessary to dispel some of the common criticisms of the 
current policy framework. For example, it may appear that the government 
subsidies consist mainly of grants given to established artists that fit the mold 
of generic rock or pop (i.e., what is 'hot' on the charts). Should these grants 
disappear, it would follow, there would be no substantial effect on the industry 
as a whole. This misconception, one that I held myself before undertaking this 
study, seems to stem from the tendency for FACTOR and MusicAction to 
distribute their money in this way, to recipients such as Ron Sexsmith, David 
Usher, Colin James and Jeff Healey (in recent years). Although these artists 
may have been worthy beneficiaries of funding support earlier in their careers, 
once they were established, they no longer needed assistance. Many 
musicians see this kind of support as hypocritical, since generally the idea of 
government subsidies is that they should be given to those who need it most. 
And, since the media tend to focus on large FACTOR grants, often given to 
established artists, many of the other grants and loans are often overlooked. 
These 'other' grants allow for many of the events and organizations that 
display the wealth of talent in this country and educate the artists and 
entrepreneurs in the ways that they can become stronger. 
When asked about federal grants, Ian Lavsky responded by stating the 
following: 
The most important thing regardless of how somebody gets 
something off the ground, or how an autonomous arts organization 
or arts business gets running, is where they want to end up and 
what they'll stop paying attention to along the way. Such that all 
kinds of complicity with an economic order that, regardless of 
whether you're Canadian or American, needs to be thought about 
and challenged, or at least more people need to think about what 
alternative they're building. In my experience, Canadian arts 
funders, and particularly FACTOR, and the 'industry' grants that are 
out there for music, their definition of success is plugging into 
precisely what we get so demoralized about when we see indie 
labels that have built something really good and sustainable and 
kind of pure chasing after larger sales of a particular title, letting it 
get hyped up, selling it off to a major. And that's I guess where the 
frustration of how music gets funded in Canada versus an arts 
model. .. nobody expects someone who's getting a Canada Council 
grant to all of a sudden make a profit. If you're going to be a record 
label then you've already got one foot in some kind of commercial 
activity, and should see it through, and by all means try and make it 
work and sustain itself if it can. What burns my ass is when I see 5 
or 50 or 500,000 dollar grants being given to co mpanies that 
employ a whole level of middle management that's largely hungry 
for middle management-type salaries and perks, and are essentially 
mediating between the band and the marketplace, feeding that 
entire middle echelon of advertising ... that's what ends up costing. 
However, even the grants given to the already established artists may 
assist the Canadian music industry in general because, since they help to 
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increase the popularity of these artists worldwide, they also serve to promote 
the idea that Canadian music is of high quality and competitive in international 
markets. Many Canadian musicians have received international acclaim over 
the past few years - Nelly Furtado, Michael Buble, Celine Dion, Nickelback, 
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Sarah McLaughlin, Simple Plan, among many others. While many consider it 
unfortunate that Canadian artists often need to be recognized as successful 
outside of Canada before they are ever acknowledged within Canada, this 
'problem' can be remedied. Implementing policies such as those discussed 
and eventually rejected by the CRTC to encourage radio stations and 
television music channels to play newer, less established artists can give new 
Canadian artists local and national exposure in Canada. Despite the fact that 
the CRTC has not sided with such proposals does not necessarily mean that 
they can never be re-addressed by the regulator, especially if calls for such 
policies continue to appear in published materials and the media. 
While it is not always the case that a Canadian artist is anointed as a 
rising star once the American media has confirmed this status, it happens 
frequently (as in the case of Arcade Fire, mentioned above). I asked Patricia 
Elliott what she thought about this tendency. She responded by stating: 
I think with Arcade Fire and Merge, or Wolf Parade and Sub Pop, 
they obviously chose those labels because they are really effective 
and professional. But if you look at labels such as Arts and Crafts, 
out of Toronto or at Nettwerk out here in Vancouver and the roster 
of artists that they have, from what I've understood talking with them, 
it's very much a relationship; you work with people that you want to 
work with and that you like. For Arcade Fire, they just might have 
perhaps clicked with whoever it was from [Merge], and might have 
decided that that was probably the best way for them to go. I mean, 
look at Broken Social Scene; they're huge, yet they've decided to 
stay within Canada. There are some artists that are always going to 
look for a US label because they'll see that as a sign of success, but 
I mean the Canadian music scene in the last couple of years has 
just gotten so much press and attention, and it's just doing so 
well. ... they're going to go with the label that they think is going to 
give them the most chance of success. Look at Jeffrey Remedios 
from Arts and Crafts - he's very well regarded internationally and 
someone who's really smart and sawy and finds really good up-
and-coming talent, I mean Terry McBride (CEO of Nettwerk) is 
probably the top indie manager in the world now. 
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In terms of market size, the tendency to look to American media appraisal for 
validation of Canadian artists is almost unavoidable, considering that the 
population of California alone is higher than the population of Canada. 
However, if Canada continues to nurture and produce successful artists at the 
same rate as it has over the past few years, there is a chance that this will 
lead to the creation of an increasingly supportive infrastructure that will keep 
Canadian artists in Canada, working with Canadian companies. 
The Canadian public policy framework is not perfect and an argument 
could be made for a comprehensive review of both the regulations and the 
subsidy and granting process in light of recent developments in the industry 
(similar arguments are made, but no specific recommendations offered, by 
Shelley Stein-Sacks in her recent report to Heritage Canada on the 
independent music sector; see Stein-Sacks 2006). 
Although I set out to demonstrate that the federal government's policies, 
regulatory regimes and subsidies are insufficiently developed to permit 
Canadian independent artists to gain access to local markets, I actually found 
the opposite to be true. While it is true that the deregulation of the cultural 
industries and liberalizing of anti-monopoly restrictions has created significant 
problems for the industry, we cannot effectively close the nation off from such 
worldwide economic trends as free trade. On this topic, Patricia Elliott stated: 
I think it's just a fine balance. You can't stop free trade; you can't 
stop commercialization. It is going to happen and if you want a 
healthy economic environment you have to allow for that, and in our 
case they're going to allow for free trade they're going to allow for 
an open market access, but at the same time they're going to 
support the industries ... and provide them with the environment 
and the tools to succeed. Once they get to a certain level, the 
amount of funding that they're eligible for diminishes, because you 
don't need it. We work with small to medium sized enterprises - I 
mean I work with Nettwerk, but they've never received any funding. 
They don't need that. The kind of services they need from me are 
very different. 
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Academic studies taking a political economy perspective have been justifiably 
eager to point out the weaknesses of Canada's cultural industries but lacking 
in the recommendation of practical solutions. Jody Berland, for example, cites 
Bernie Finkelstein of True North Records in support of the view that Canada is 
a victim of cultural imperialism: "Canada is not a free marketplace. Canada is 
basically a third world country by definition. We do not own distribution, we do 
not own manufacturing - which is the definition at the U.N. of a third world 
country" (cited in Berland 1991,322). Berland goes on to draw a comparison 
between Canadian talent in the music industry and softwood lumber as "the 
well-known role played historically by Canada in the provision of raw materials, 
or staples, to a technologically and economically dominant manufacturing 
class in the US" (321). Furthermore, the highest costs are placed on the 
shoulders of the indie labels and musicians. As John Sinclair has noted, "the 
continuous development and production of new cultural products has high 
fixed costs ... however, the costs of reproduction are marginal" (36). 
Nevertheless, he has also noted that "cultural products are distinct from other 
commodities in that one of their use values lies in the ephemeral appeal of 
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novelty or difference", which is something that Canadian artists continue to 
provide. 
Generally speaking, those who achieve 'success', not only within the 
music industry but in industry and the arts in general, are those who can fill a 
gap in what is already provided or who have the vision to come up with 
something completely new, as opposed to simply 'copying' an already 
established model of a successful business or a commercial 'sound'. For 
example, Ian lavsky of Constellation Records described how his label took 
advantage of a gap in the local Montreal music scene: 
In 1996, my partner Don in the label and myself actually started by 
looking for a space in Montreal; we wanted to actually open a 
performance space. I was playing in a band at the time, Don was 
working at a job he hated in Toronto (and a huge music fan) and 
was making frequent visits here. The live music landscape was 
pretty terrible in this city as most of the venues that were available 
were dance clubs as of 11 pm and you would get $200-300 for the 
privilege of taking their stage early on in the night. There was just a 
real absence of spaces to support anything that was a little bit more 
experimental, for the people weren't interested in plugging into an 
inevitable ladder towards generating interest from established labels, 
or using it as a springboard to open for the 'big act' that was going 
to come to town. We had always imagined that a record label would 
emerge from out of this local, artist-friendly small venue that we 
were going to start up and pay for with something like $5000 that 
we had saved between us. 
In a rapidly changing industry such as the music business has been over the 
last decade, as lavsky and others have repeatedly emphasized, smaller scale 
enterprises such as independent record labels have the flexibility to adapt to 
new technologies, changing consumer tastes and a constantly shifting 
economic climate. 
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There is hope that if Canadian public policies and subsidies continue to 
strengthen the foundation of the countless, small independent businesses and 
artists that make up the Canadian music industry, then eventuaUy, the industry 
will be strong enough to thrive on its own without grant monies or regulatory 
regimes. In the meantime, however, those who work in the industry count on 
the continuing interventionist policies, and to lose them prematurely would no 
doubt bring grave repercussions. 
Despite the fact that the current structure of the industry puts the indie 
labels at a disadvantage, in the long run and in the face of the changing 
industry, the indies have the advantage of being able to cope better with the 
smaller-scale, local scenes - which seem to be the future of the industry - as 
well as being in a better position to take advantage of, and take risks on, new 
methods of promotion and distribution. Not only do the federal grants 
acknowledge the cultural importance of independent artists in our society and 
create a space for their voices, but they continue to provide support for those 
working within an industry that is in the process of a major shift, the outcome 
of which can only be speculated upon. Whether or not an indie label, band, 
organization or business has had the opportunity to have access directly to 
federal grant monies, the public policies and subsidies have had a substantial 
effect on the industry since their inception. Although these policies are not 
without their problems or controversies, they are no doubt vital to the industry 
according to those who work within it. 
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